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How the First Forty Years of Circuit
Precedent Got Title VII’s Sex Discrimination
Provision Wrong
Jessica A. Clarke†

Abstract
The Supreme Court will soon decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it is discrimination “because of sex” to fire an employee
because of their sexual orientation or transgender identity. There’s a simple
textual argument that it is: An employer cannot take action on the basis of an
employee’s sexual orientation or transgender identity without considering
the employee’s sex. But while this argument is simple, it was not one that
federal courts adopted until recently. This has caused some judges to object
that the simple argument must be inconsistent with the original meaning of
Title VII. In the words of one Fifth Circuit judge, “If the first forty years of
uniform circuit precedent nationwide somehow got the original
understanding of Title VII wrong, no one has explained how.”
This Essay explains how the first forty years of circuit precedent got
Title VII wrong. It demonstrates that, rather than relying on the statutory
text, early appellate decisions relied on their era’s misunderstanding of
LGBTQ identities as pathological, unnatural, and deviant. The errors of the
† Jessica A. Clarke, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to Katie Eyer,
David Noll, Brian Soucek, and Ezra Young for helpful conversations and comments. Thanks to
Katie Hanschke of the Vanderbilt Law Library for invaluable assistance with sources.
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early cases persisted as a result of stare decisis, until the old doctrine was
rendered indefensible by changing social attitudes, the rise of textualism, and
the Supreme Court’s recognition that Title VII forbids an employer from
insisting that men or women conform to sex stereotypes. This account has
important implications for the pending cases, as well as for social movements
that seek to disable prejudice.
I. Introduction
This term, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in three cases1
asking it to interpret the meaning of employment discrimination because of
sex for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The question
is whether firing someone because of their sexual orientation or transgender
identity qualifies as a “discharge . . . because of” that “individual’s . . . sex.”3
There’s a simple argument that the answer is yes. Accepting the
conservative definition of sex as a biological male or female classification,4
it is impossible to categorize someone as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender without first classifying them as male or female. There would be

1. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 Fed. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” (emphasis
added)). In 1991, the statute was amended to provide for employer liability if the plaintiff can show
sex was a “motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice,” id. § 2000e-2(m), but a plaintiff’s remedies under this amendment are limited if the
defendant can show that sex was not a determinative or “but for” cause, id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
3. Id. § 2000e-2. This question has enormous stakes. Twenty-six states do not expressly prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Natasha Bach, Should Title VII Civil
Rights Protections Include the LGBTQ Community?, FORTUNE (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://fortune.com/2019/04/23/title-vii-supreme-court-lgbt-case/ [https://perma.cc/QB29-5VLD].
4. I accept this definition just for the sake of argument. But see William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace
Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338 (2017) (discussing contemporary dictionary definitions that
defined “sex” to include what we might today call gender and sexuality). I take no position on the
objectively “correct” definition of sex or gender. See Jessica Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132
HARV. L. REV. 894, 933–36 (2019) (arguing against the use of universal definitions for “sex” and
“gender”).
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no sexual orientation5 or transgender identity6 in a world without sex
classifications like male or female.7 This simple argument should appeal to
conservative jurists,8 who are drawn to strict constructions of the text9 and
who generally agree with “blindness” and “merit” as tropes in discrimination
law.10
And yet, many jurists seem to think this argument is too clever by half.11
In a recent concurrence, Judge Ho of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
argued that the problem is that “[n]o one seriously contends that, at the time

5. See, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113 (“To . . . identify the sexual orientation of a particular
person, we need to know the sex of the person and that of the people to whom he or she is
attracted.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Flaum, J., concurring) (“Fundamental to the definition of homosexuality is the sexual attraction to
individuals of the ‘same’ sex. . . . One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also
accounting for their sex: doing so would render ‘same’ . . . meaningless.”); KATIE R. EYER, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND LGBT EQUALITY 3–4 (2017),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Sex_Discrimination_Law_and_LGBT_
Equality.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RMU-GWRZ] (discussing the argument that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and transgender status are forms of sex discrimination because they
necessarily take sex into account).
6. See, e.g., R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 575 (“[I]t is analytically
impossible to fire an employee based on that employee’s status as a transgender person without
being motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s sex.”).
7. In addition to the argument that Title VII requires sex-blind decision-making, there’s a related
point, often called the comparator argument, that goes as follows: if Steve were Eve, no one would
object to his marriage to Adam, and if Caitlyn had been assigned female at birth rather than male,
no one would object to the fact that she identifies as a woman. See Jessica A. Clarke, Frontiers of
Sex Discrimination Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 809, 820 (2017); Eyer, supra note 5, at 4, 10. It is no
answer to this comparator argument that gay and transgender men are fired just like gay and
transgender women. An employer who fires a woman for being too manly cannot cure its
discrimination by firing a man for being too womanly. The statute speaks of the “individual” who
may not be discharged because of their sex. See supra note 2.
8. The sex-blind and comparator arguments are not the only arguments, nor are they my favorite
arguments. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 833–37 (advancing arguments based on anti-stereotyping,
anti-subordination, and intersectionality principles). Other arguments rely on analogies between
discrimination based on same-sex relationships and anti-miscegenation rules, or between
transgender identity and religious conversion, id. at 821; Eyer, supra note 5, at 6, principles of
immutability, Clarke, supra note 7, at 824–32, and Title VII’s “normative ideal of a merit-based
workplace,” see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4, at 334.
9. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 48 (1995) (“Attention to
the language of the statute may therefore lead to something of a paradox—the stricter a
constructionist one is, the more seriously one takes statutory language, the more inescapably one is
led to a quite radical view of the effect of Title VII.”).
10. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 143–44
(2017) (discussing the libertarian underpinnings of the anti-classification principle, which requires
“blindness” as to prohibited grounds for discrimination such as race or sex, so that all individuals
may be judged on their own merits).
11. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring)
(rejecting the argument that Title VII requires employment decisions that are “blind to sex”).
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of enactment, the public meaning and understanding of Title VII included
sexual orientation or transgender discrimination.”12 It is important to note his
argument is not that courts are bound by how Congress originally expected
that the statute would be applied. Modern textualists claim they must adhere
to the public meaning of the words Congress used—here “because
of . . . sex”—not how Congress expected those words to be applied at the
time.13 Indeed, in a 1998 case resolving whether “male-on-male sexual
harassment” is discrimination “because of . . . sex,” Justice Scalia recognized
that although male-on-male harassment “was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . . statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”14 The
same argument must go for how the public originally thought the statute
would be applied.15 Surely the public in 1964, no more than Congress,
imagined the statute’s application to male-on-male harassment.
Nonetheless, perhaps there is something wrong with literal
interpretations that did not occur to anyone until recently. Some judges
believe the literal arguments must be out of touch with the original meaning
of the statute because they are of recent vintage.16 Judge Ho argues: “If the
first forty years of uniform circuit precedent nationwide somehow got the
original understanding of Title VII wrong, no one has explained how.”17
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a matter of interpretive method, I agree with my colleagues that
the scope of Title VII is not limited by the subjective intentions of the enacting legislators.”).
14. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
15. See Katie R. Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63,
67–68 (2019) (refuting the argument that the public’s original expected application of statutory
language should govern). For example, in Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Correction, 524 U.S. 206, 211–12
(1998), the Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act’s “broad text must be
extended to prisoners—even if Congress might not have anticipated or desired its application to that
context.” Eyer, supra at 98.
16. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 167 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (“The majority does not discover a ‘plain’ yet hidden meaning in
Title VII, sufficiently obscure as to wholly elude every appellate court, including this one, until the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively, 853 F.3d at
361 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“Suddenly sexual-orientation discrimination is sex discrimination and
thus is actionable under Title VII. What justification is offered for this radical change in a wellestablished, uniform interpretation of an important—indeed, transformational—statute? . . . From
the statute’s inception to the present day, the appellate courts have unanimously and repeatedly read
the statute the same way, as my colleagues must and do acknowledge.”).
17. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 336 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring). But see
Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and
Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 39 (2000) (“Legal
scholars have put forward a variety of theoretical explanations for why courts have failed to deal
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This Essay explains how the first forty years of circuit precedent got the
original meaning of Title VII’s sex discrimination provision wrong. 18 It
wasn’t that the literal argument never occurred to anyone. In the 1970s and
1980s, litigants, district court judges, and dissenting appellate judges made
textual arguments. But appellate judges outright refused to apply the statute’s
terms. These early precedents self-consciously deviated from the text of the
statute, inventing limiting principles to leave gay, lesbian, and transgender
plaintiffs unprotected. This is unsurprising, considering that, as Professor
William Eskridge has argued, sexual acts between same-sex couples could
be criminalized until 2003, and the Supreme Court did not recognize that
“homosexuality” is a normal human variation until 2015.19 It was widely
assumed, at the time of the early cases, that “homosexual” and “transsexual”
people were blameworthy, deviant, or dangerous.20
This Essay traces that assumption through the early cases,
demonstrating that these precedents were informed by prejudices and
misunderstandings that obscured textual arguments.21 It shows judges laid
bare their biases in the texts of their opinions, describing transgender identity
as a psychological disorder, perhaps even a “psychopathology,”22 and
referring to the linkages between gender nonconformity and “sexual
aberration.”23 This examination of early doctrine reveals that the story is not
just about the acceptability of prejudice against gay people. Most of the early
appellate cases were about transgender women,24 whom judges described
with transgender people in a coherent or principled way.”). For a recent take, see Anthony Michael
Kreis, Dead Hand Vogue, 54 U. RICH L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft date Aug. 7, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3430357
[https://perma.cc/S5Q4-JH5N]
(arguing that the old precedents erred in focusing on groups rather than individuals).
18. The first federal appellate case to get Title VII right on transgender discrimination was the
Sixth Circuit in 2004 in Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004), and on sexual
orientation, it was the Seventh Circuit in 2017 in Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52.
19. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 333.
20. Id.
21. Although Professor Eskridge’s article mentions some of the early cases discussed in this
Essay, id. at 353 n.112, 376–77, it does not examine their reasoning. The early cases have long been
criticized on various grounds, see, e.g., Currah & Minter, supra note 17, at 37–42 (collecting
sources), but their reasoning has not been examined against today’s understandings of LGBTQ
identity. Recent articles have criticized the cases on other grounds such as their invention of history.
See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1307, 1375–78 (2012) (offering the cases discussed in this Essay as examples of how courts
invented a so-called “traditional” concept of sex discrimination to preserve traditional gender
norms).
22. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
23. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 328 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting the district
judge’s explanation of why the plaintiff was not hired).
24. A “transgender woman” is a person who was assigned “male” at birth but identifies as a
woman. At the risk of applying anachronistic labels, I use the term “transgender” to describe any
plaintiff whose gender identity did not match the one associated with the sex they were assigned at
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with bewilderment, skepticism, and voyeuristic curiosity.25 The foundational
case in the series cited to a study of transgender women finding their “most
prevailing feature” to be “hysterical personality” and noting that some
doctors regarded “the transsexual”26 as “undeveloped psychologically; as
immature; as crippled; as disabled, if not sick.”27 These courts conflated gay
men, transgender women, and gender-nonconforming men together as a
group outside the statute’s protection.28 They understood gender
nonconformity as the trait that made “transsexual” and “homosexual” people
a separate social class—different from the normal men and women protected
by the statute. While some opinions made empty professions of abhorrence
for all forms of discrimination, close examination of their reasoning,

birth. See, e.g., GLAAD, GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 10 (10th ed. 2016),
http://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/GLAAD-Media-Reference-Guide-Tenth-Edition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QZT-N3P8] (defining “transgender”). While infants in the United States are
assigned a binary “male” or “female” sex designation at birth, see Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and
Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 792–93 (2015) (discussing sex assignment practices for infants
under federal law), a person may have a gender identity as a boy, a girl, a man, a woman, or any
number of nonbinary variations, see Clarke, supra note 4, at 905–10 (discussing the diversity of
nonbinary identities). Transgender men did not appear as plaintiffs in reported Title VII cases until
recently. For insights on why this might be, see, for example, JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A
TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF FEMININITY 4 (2007) (arguing
that trans women “challenge[] those in our society who wish to glorify maleness and masculinity”)
and SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF TODAY’S REVOLUTION 100 (2d ed.
2017) (arguing that transgender women were historically more visible and therefore easier targets
for discrimination).
25. See infra notes 170–204 and accompanying text (discussing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984), which called transgender identity “untraditional and unusual”); see
Currah & Minter, supra note 17, 39–40 (“For the most part, transgender people have not been
excluded from civil rights protections because of conceptual or philosophical failures in legal
reasoning, but rather because they have not been viewed as worthy of protection or, in some cases,
even as human.”).
26. Joseph C. Finney et al., A Psychological Study of Transsexualism, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECOND INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM ON GENDER DYSPHORIA SYNDROME 82, 85 (D.R. Laub
& P. Gandy, eds. 1974) (cited in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1977)). The term “transsexual,” which is increasingly regarded as archaic, was popularized by
doctors in the 1940s as a term for a medical condition that would require “hormone treatment,
surgery, and total transformation.” Kris Franklin & Sarah E. Chinn, Transsexual, Transgender,
Trans: Reading Judicial Nomenclature in Title VII Cases, 32 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1,
8 (2017). The term “‘transgender,’ as currently understood by many trans people, works to resist
the historical pressures of medicalization that were built into ‘transsexual,’ along with the mandates
of hormones, surgery, and teleology.” Id. at 10.
27. Finney et al., supra note 26, at 82, 85 (cited in Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 n.3 on the “origin
and development of transsexualism”).
28. Professor Francisco Valdes was an early critic of these cases in a lengthy article that
deconstructed their formal reasoning, showing how they “ignorantly or strategically” tangled and
disentangled the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation to preserve traditional values. See
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,”
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
136–53, 151 (1995).

2019]

How Circuit Precedent Got Title VII Wrong

89

language, and sources demonstrates that appellate judges were blinded by the
biases and misunderstandings of their era.
Contrary to the views of dissenting judges today,29 the early opinions
were not based on the plain meaning of the text. Courts openly explained that
they were inventing limiting principles to preserve employer discretion to
enforce traditional gender norms.30 Otherwise, the statute’s plain language
would require that employers accommodate “counter-culture” phenomena,
such as long-haired male hippies in the 1970s31 and “transsexual” workers
who seemed to create unsolvable restroom dilemmas.32
This Essay also illuminates the doctrinal moves courts made to avoid
following Title VII’s text. One move was inventing immutability
principles—borrowed from Equal Protection doctrine—that would limit
Title VII’s text.33 On these immutability principles, discrimination against
“homosexuals” and “transsexuals” was not considered sex discrimination
because those conditions were not understood to be accidents of birth, traits
a person could not change, or traits a person was blameless for.34
“Homosexuality” and “transsexualism” were considered deviant behaviors
that should be stopped, sexual preferences that should not be accommodated,
and mental illnesses that should not be indulged.
Under the influence of then-prevalent methodologies of statutory
interpretation that asked about the spirit rather than the letter of the law,35
early courts also invented limiting principles based on conjectures about
congressional intent. Specifically, they interpreted Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision to reach only those forms of sex-based mistreatment
that had disparate effects on men or women as groups.36 Not only was this
interpretation atextual, but it was also contrary to precedent and based on
myths about the legislative history behind Title VII’s sex amendment.37 Even
after their rationales had been invalidated, the old cases continued to exert
precedential force for decades.
29. See supra note 16.
30. See Franklin, supra note 21, at 1352–53; KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER
NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 61 (2016).
31. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
32. See infra notes 47–48, 163–169, 301–308, and accompanying text.
33. Cf. Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 62–85 (2015) (describing
variations on the immutability principle and explaining how courts use those principles to limit the
reach of Title VII in other contexts).
34. Id. at 13–28.
35. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining that early cases
had followed the contra-textual approach to statutory interpretation from Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
36. See infra notes 134–143 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
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Today, neither homosexuality38 nor transgender identity39 is considered
a sign of psychopathy, degeneracy, or threat. Text has replaced purpose as
the starting point of statutory interpretation,40 and the Supreme Court has
made clear that Title VII protects individuals against sex-role stereotyping
that constrains the lives of both men and women, not just sex discrimination
that affects men or women as a group disproportionately.41 This Essay
describes how these developments—not changes in the meaning of the term
“because of . . . sex”—are what resulted in the change in federal appellate
court opinions over the past twenty years.
It is time for the Supreme Court to recognize that Title VII’s prohibition
on discrimination because of sex forbids discrimination on the bases of
sexual orientation and transgender identity. This Essay shows the Court
should not rely on the fact that appellate courts reached the wrong
conclusions for forty years. Those appellate decisions were not based on the
statutory text. They engaged in wholesale invention of immutability and
group-rights principles to prevent Title VII’s guarantee of workplace equality
from reaching plaintiffs wrongly regarded as mentally ill and morally
suspect.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court resolves the pending cases, this
Essay’s examination of the doctrine’s evolution has lessons for social
movements that seek to disable prejudice. One lesson is that theories often
associated with progressive causes—such as purposive methodologies of
statutory interpretation, immutability theories, and group rights—can also be

38. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
39. “Transsexuality” and “gender identity disorder” are no longer diagnoses. Compare AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261–63
(3rd ed. 1980) (hereinafter, “DSM-3”) (defining “an incongruence between anatomic sex and gender
identity” as “gender identity disorder” generally and “transsexualism” specifically when it occurs
in adults), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 452–53 (5th ed. 2013) (hereinafter, “DSM-5”) (stating that “a marked incongruence”
between an individual’s assigned sex and gender identity could be “gender dysphoria” if it is
accompanied by “distress”).
40. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 71, 73 (2006) (“For a not inconsiderable part of our history, the Supreme Court held that the
‘letter’ (text) of a statute must yield to its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflicted. . . . Near the
close of the twentieth century, however, the ‘new textualism’ challenged the prevailing judicial
orthodoxy by arguing that the Constitution, properly understood, requires judges to treat the clear
import of an enacted text as conclusive, even when the text fits poorly with its apparent background
purposes.”).
41. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 117 (2d Cir. 2018) (Katzmann, C.J.)
(applying City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) to ask whether an
individual faced discrimination in a way she would not have “but for” her sex), cert. granted, 139
S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the logic
of the early cases had been “eviscerated” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
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deployed against progressive causes. Another is that medical authorities play
a role in civil rights disputes, both in pathologizing the traits that come to
define stigmatized groups and in undoing that very process.42 And another is
that broad statutory guarantees of equality, which by their very nature
challenge conventional prejudices, will be contested by judicial interpreters
who are not immune from conventional prejudices. The project of such
statutes will always be incomplete, refined over time as social movements
contest the prejudices of their eras. A final lesson is that the prejudices of the
past, lying entombed in doctrine, can continue to haunt the promise of
equality, even after those prejudices have largely died out in the broader
culture.43
Part I of this Essay explains how circuit courts of the 1970s and 1980s
failed to apply the text of Title VII, which prohibits the discharge of any
individual because of their sex. Part II explains the legal and social
developments that allowed circuit courts to see their errors, beginning in the
2000s.
II.

How Circuit Courts Got It Wrong

Until the 2000s, the consensus among circuit courts was that
discrimination on the basis of “transsexualism” or “sexual preference” was
not a form of sex discrimination. By the 1990s, this consensus was so firmly
established that judicial decisions referred to it perfunctorily and without
critical consideration. An examination of the early cases, however, reveals
reasons to be critical of this consensus. The first precedents failed to apply
the term “because of . . . sex” because judges thought it would be anomalous
for the statute to protect people they labeled “transsexuals,” “homosexuals,”
or “effeminate men.” Based on prevailing social mores, these types of gender
nonconformity were thought to evince moral failings and dangerous mental
illnesses. Accordingly, courts invented limiting principles to constrain the
statute’s plain text. One principle was that the statute only prohibited sex
discrimination with significant disparate impacts on women or men as a
group. Another was that the statute only reached sex discrimination that
implicated what courts considered to be immutable traits or fundamental
rights. These limiting principles appear nowhere in the text of the statute.
Rather than reflecting a broad consensus, a number of these opinions were
divided or reversed the contrary opinions of district court judges.
42. Cf. Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion Therapy Bans, 68
ALA. L. REV. 793, 805–10 (2017) (discussing the role of mainstream medical authorities in bans on
“conversion” therapy).
43. Cf. Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcizing the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting Invalid
Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 522 (2009) (discussing the “ghostly afterlife” of overruled
precedents in equal-protection doctrine).

92

Texas Law Review Online

[Vol. 98:83

A. Ramona Holloway
The foundational case in the series is a 1977 Ninth Circuit decision,
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.44 The plaintiff in that case, Ramona
Holloway, had presented as a man when she began working at Arthur
Andersen in 1969.45 As a man, Holloway had received promotions and pay
raises.46 But when Holloway began to present as a woman, her supervisor
complained about the fact that she “wore red nail polish, glossy red lipstick,
hair in a French twist and carried a purse.”47 While Holloway’s use of the
men’s room caused “embarrassment,” her “desire to use the ladies’ room
would have caused even greater problems.”48 Arthur Andersen suggested to
Holloway that she “find another job where the sex change would not be
known.”49 Shortly after requesting that her first name be changed to
“Ramona” in the company’s records, Holloway was fired.50
Holloway argued she was fired because of sex: put simply, her employer
had rejected “Ramona Holloway (as a woman) in the job previously
performed by Robert Holloway.”51 She argued that the term “sex” included
not just men and women, but also individuals who did not fit neatly into either
category.52 This argument was based on the medical definition of a “male-tofemale transsexual” at the time: an individual who is “mentally and
emotionally” a woman but has “male” anatomy.53 Holloway argued that this
interpretation was consistent with Title VII’s purpose: to ensure that every
individual would be evaluated based on their “job capabilities” rather than
their “gender.”54 Her brief used the term “gender” to avoid conflation with
the meaning of “sex” as sexual activity.55 Arthur Andersen countered that the
statute only prohibited discrimination “because an individual is a male or a
44. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). In 2000, the Ninth Circuit held this case had been overruled
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000).
45. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
46. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977) (No. 76-2248), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/76-2248-appellant-opening-brief/ [https://perma.cc
/HR5A-Z82P].
47. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977)
(No. 76-2248), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/76-2248-appellee-brief/ [https://perma.cc/JE33-NWKP].
I am grateful to Katrina Rose for tracking down and sharing the briefs in this case.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
51. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 7.
52. Id. at 4–5.
53. See id. at 2 (quoting the plaintiff’s physician on why she had been “diagnosed as a genuine
male-to-female transsexual”).
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 4.
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female.”56 It argued Holloway was not protected because, “at the time of the
discharge, [she] was a transsexual in the process of transformation from male
to female.”57
To resolve the dispute, the Ninth Circuit turned immediately to Title
VII’s “legislative history,”58 and concluded, “Congress had only the
traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind.”59 It based this conclusion on the fact
that a 1972 amendment to the 1964 Act was intended “to remedy the
economic deprivation of women as a class.”60 Support for this class-based
interpretation is not to be found in Title VII’s text, which forbids
discrimination against individuals on particular grounds, such as sex, not
against particular groups, such as women or men.61 The court thought it had
license to offer a group-based interpretation of the statute due to the “dearth”
of legislative history behind the addition of “sex” to the original statute in
1964.62 Yet the idea that there is scant legislative history on the sex
amendment is a myth that only became “true by virtue of repetition.”63 The
historical record reveals support for Holloway’s view that the 1964 Congress
intended to make an individual’s sex irrelevant to employment decisions64
56. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 47, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
59. Id.
60. Id. The court was aware that men could bring claims under Title VII. As Holloway’s brief
pointed out, courts at the time allowed sex discrimination claims by men as well as women.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 6 (citing Diaz v. Pan Am, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
and Wilson v. Sibler Mem’l Hosp., 288 F. 2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). In 1983, the Supreme Court
would make clear that “congressional discussion focused on the needs of female members of the
work force . . . does not create a ‘negative inference’ limiting the scope of the Act to the specific
problem that motivated its enactment.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 462 U.S. 669, 679 (1983).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Clarke, supra note 10, at 110–19 (explaining how Title VII,
unlike some other discrimination statutes, forbids discrimination on particular grounds, such as
“race” and “sex,” not against groups such as black and white people or men and women).
62. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
63. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995). In the early days of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, agency officials resistant to enforcement of sex discrimination law
publicized an apocryphal story that the sex amendment had only been proposed in jest in an attempt
to derail the Act. Id. at 25; Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L.
REV. 995, 1015 (2015) (discussing research demonstrating that the sex amendment resulted from
feminist advocacy both in and outside of Congress).
64. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 63, at 25 (discussing how the sex amendment passed over the
opposition that “biological differences between women and men could justify sex-specific
employment practices”); Franklin, supra note 21, at 1332 (explaining that Congress members voted
for the amendment even though they believed it would reach forms of discrimination that do not
affect all women as a class, such as the practices of certain airlines to fire “stewardesses” when they
got married (discussing 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (statement of Rep. Bass))); id. at 1329 (explaining
that the sex amendment passed over the opposition that its implications in terms of unsettling
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unless it was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), a defense not
raised by Arthur Andersen.65
In any event, the court did not offer a precise definition of the
“traditional” meaning of “sex,” other than to reject any interpretation that
would extend coverage to “transsexuals as a class.”66 Instead, it referred to
Arthur Andersen’s argument that sex was “based on anatomical
characteristics.”67 But even accepting Arthur Andersen’s definition,
Holloway’s presumed68 male anatomy was certainly what resulted in her
firing. Arthur Andersen admitted as much.69 Holloway, however, did not
argue she was fired on account of being presumed to be an “anatomical
male.”70 Nor did the court consider the point.
This can be explained by the grip of immutability on thinking about
discrimination at the time.71 The theory of immutability is that societal
traditional gender roles would be “unlimited” (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (statement of Rep.
Celler))); cf. Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee:
Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339–40 (2014) (explaining that support for the sex
amendment came from “what we today call intersectionality,” in other words, the concern that one
group status would be used to justify discrimination based on another; for example, Representative
Martha Griffiths was concerned that if sex discrimination were not prohibited along with race
discrimination, black women would continue to be denied equal employment opportunities).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The BFOQ defense applies to sex but not race. Id.
66. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662, 664.
67. Id. at 662. In a footnote, the court quoted a dictionary offering multiple definitions of “sex,”
including one that went beyond “structural” anatomy to include reproductive differences that were
“functional” and “behavioral.” Id. at 662 n.4 (quoting WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 347, 795 (1970)). It did not explain which of these differences were included in the
traditional definition.
68. Presumption is sufficient; “actual knowledge” is not required by the statutory language.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032
(2015) (Scalia, J.) (“It is significant that § 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose a knowledge
requirement.”).
69. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 47, at 6 & n.* (“[I]t cannot be a violation of Title VII for an
employer to discharge an anatomical male for appearing at work dressed and made up as a female”
and “[i]n the instant case, there had been no surgery.”).
70. It is possible that Holloway preferred not to make any argument inconsistent with her status
as a woman. Cf. Sharon M. McGowan, Working with Clients to Develop Compatible Visions of
What It Means to “Win” A Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205, 205 (2010) (quoting successful litigant Diane Schroer, a transgender woman, as saying “I
haven’t gone through all this only to have a court vindicate my rights as a gender non-conforming
man.”); Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of
Transsexualism”, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 315 (1997) (“[T]ranssexuals are unlikely to sue for
discrimination based on a sex they do not believe they are.”). In the mid-2000s, Schroer’s lawyers
avoided this dilemma by pleading that their client “had a female gender identity, and thus was a
woman, but that she had likely been perceived to be a man by the hiring official.” McGowan, supra
at 215.
71. In equal protection law, the question of whether a trait is immutable may be one
consideration in deciding if government classifications based on that trait should be held to
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condemnation should not fall on those who bear no individual responsibility
for a trait.72 Holloway could not make the argument that the basis for
discrimination was her “male” anatomy, because that would have left her
with no way to distinguish her case from the male “transvestite,”73 thought at
the time to be a man who wore women’s attire as a fetish, not as the result of
any immutable identity.74 Cross-dressing was still regarded as a sex offense
in some U.S. jurisdictions in 1977.75 Moreover, Holloway’s “male” anatomy
had proved to be mutable; indeed, she had had surgery by the time of her
appeal. Instead, Holloway argued that “transsexuality” was immutable,
defining it as “a condition where ‘gender reversal . . . is present as soon as
any behavior that can be called masculinity or femininity begins, even as
early as one year of age’ or as including those ‘persons not readily classifiable
as male or female.’”76 Arthur Andersen called out Holloway for “advancing
the theory that transsexualism [is] organically and biologically
determined.”77
A dissenting judge agreed with Holloway. In his view, Holloway was
“a person completing surgically that part of nature’s handiwork which
apparently was left incomplete somewhere along the line.”78 But he noted
that immutability was not relevant: Title VII drew no distinctions between a
plaintiff who “was born female” and one who “was born ambiguous and
chose to become female.”79 He reasoned that Holloway had a claim based on
“the language of the statute, itself,” despite the fact that “Congress probably
never contemplated that Title VII would apply to transsexuals.”80 He would

heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 33, at 13–20. Title VII, by contrast does not require
that courts determine suspect classifications or protected classes; rather, it enumerates prohibited
grounds for discrimination like race and sex. Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 14–15 (discussing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972)).
73. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 7 (distinguishing transsexuals and
transvestites).
74. JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 173–76 (1980).
75. I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 10 (2008)
(collecting cases striking down criminal laws against cross-dressing in the 1970s and 1980s);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 27–28
(1999) (discussing the rationales for laws against cross-dressing). Even after cross-dressing laws
were struck down in California the 1960s, enforcement continued due to the persistence of attitudes
among police that the practice was deviant. STRYKER, supra note 24, at 76.
76. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 47, at 3.
78. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Holloway’s case from
one about “sexual preference”).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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have allowed Holloway to proceed on the theory that she was discharged “for
being or (becoming) female.”81
The majority rejected this point, arguing Holloway had been discharged
for choosing to change her sex, not for being a woman.82 Holloway had a
response to this: “an employer is not entitled to discriminate against an
employee for studying to convert to Catholicism or Judaism any more than it
is entitled to discriminate against him or her for being a Catholic or a Jew.”83
But the majority’s opinion did not address the analogy. This was likely
because, at the time, religion was thought to be a matter of faith that not only
could be changed, but should be changed if an individual’s conscience so
dictated, without interference from an employer.84 Sex, however, was thought
to be a matter of nature that could not and should not be changed.85
The Holloway opinion was demonstrably influenced by the views of
medical professionals at the time who believed that transsexuality was a
delusion, a danger, and a moral defect. The Ninth Circuit rejected Holloway’s
exculpatory definition of “transsexuality” on the ground that “there is no
generally accepted definition of the term transsexual.”86 It noted that some
psychiatrists regarded “a request for a sex change” to be “a sign of severe
81. Id. at 664. The dissenting judge thought the majority had denied Holloway’s claim because
she was not “born into the victim class.” Id.
82. Id. at 664 (majority opinion) (“Holloway has not claimed to have been treated
discriminatorily because she is male or female, but rather because she is a transsexual who chose to
change her sex.” (emphasis added)).
83. Appellant’s Rebuttal Brief at 3–4, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th
Cir. 1977) (No. 76-2248), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/76-2248-appellant-rebuttal-brief/ [https://
perma.cc/YQX9-R8MJ]; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 12.
84. Currah & Minter, supra note 17, at 41 (“Yet, the only difference between these situations
and that of a transsexual person is that while changing one’s religion or nationality is generally
considered to be a legitimate personal choice, ‘the very idea that one sex can change into another’
is likely to engender ‘ridicule and horror.’” (quoting Storrow, supra note 70, at 334)). Cf. Clarke,
supra note 33, at 27 (describing a variation on the theory of immutability that would explain
protection for religion, under which “a certain trait should not be the basis for discrimination
because it is a normatively acceptable, protected exercise of individual liberty or expression of
personality”).
85. The only potential difference, in terms of statutory text, is that Title VII was amended in
1972 to clarify that “‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observation and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee’s . . . observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). While this provision speaks to religious practices, which
could be characterized as choices, it does not speak to the distinction between conversion and status.
In any event, neither Arthur Andersen nor the court made reference to this provision.
86. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 665. The court observed that “[s]ome [experts] feel that transsexual
identification arises from psychosocial learning and others feel that the condition comes from
inherited or genetic causes.” Id. The court also rejected Holloway’s equal protection argument, on
grounds including that it had not “been established that transsexuality is an ‘immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth’ like race or national origin.” Id. at 663
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
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psychopathology.”87 To put this in historical context, a number of universitybased medical programs had legitimated surgical treatments for transgender
patients by the late 1960s.88 But at the time of Holloway, these programs were
under attack.89 Some doctors from the then-still influential psychoanalytic
tradition90 viewed transsexuals as “‘borderline psychotics’ with ‘a deepseated depression and a psychotic denial of self.’”91 The article the Holloway
court cited discussed the theory that transsexuality was the result of
dysfunctional parenting rather than nature.92 It stated that some doctors
regarded “the transsexual” as “undeveloped psychologically; as immature; as
crippled; as disabled, if not sick” and “in a broader group—with the impotent,
the frigid, and the homosexual.”93 One psychoanalyst said a transgender
woman suffered from “the delusional hope that he [sic] can really be
transformed into something he [sic] is not.”94 These doctors characterized
surgery as “amputation of male organs” that was “self-mutilating, selfdestructive, masochistic, and suicidal.”95 Rather than surgery, they
recommended psychoanalysis to cure patients of their “delusions.”96
Apprehensions about surgery were on the judges’ minds in Holloway: they
mischaracterized Holloway’s discharge as resulting from her “decision to
undergo sex change surgery,” rather than her official request to be addressed
as “Ramona.”97 In light of the court’s stated concern about whether

87. Id. at 662 n.3.
88. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 97; JAMI K. TAYLOR ET AL., THE REMARKABLE RISE OF
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 17 (2018). The clinics offered treatment only to the “‘good’ transsexual
who manifested gender dysphoria at a young age, played with gender appropriate toys, failed as a
member of [their] birth sex, and had to pass as a member of the desired sex.” TAYLOR ET AL., supra
at 17.
89. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 266.
90. See, e.g., Joel Paris, Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?, 62 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY
308 (2017) (explaining that psychoanalytic theories and treatments have been marginalized over the
past fifty years because they lack the evidentiary support expected by modern psychiatry).
91. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 266 (quoting Joost A.M. Meerloo).
92. Finney et al., supra note 26, at 82 (discussing the view that transsexuality was a result of
“certain atypical experiences, unusual kinds of interactions with one’s parents” that “result in a
stunting of one’s ability to enjoy using one’s organs in a mature, genital act with someone of the
opposite anatomical sex”).
93. Id. at 82. The article reported the results of a study of eleven “transsexual” patients that
found “hysterical personality trends of repression denial and dissociation.” Id. at 88–89.
94. Id. (quoting D.A. Russell, The Sex-Conversion Controversy, 279 N. ENG. J. MED. 535
(1968)); see also MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 265 (quoting Joost A.M. Meerloo, who asked,
“Do we have to collaborate with the sexual delusions of our patients?”).
95. Finney et al., supra note 26, at 82.
96. Id. at 83.
97. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977).
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transsexuality was “a sign of severe psychopathology,” it is unsurprising that
it found a way to interpret Title VII to exclude Holloway’s claim.98
The Holloway court also supported its exclusionary interpretation of
Title VII by pointing to the fact that “[s]everal bills [had] been introduced to
amend the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against ‘sexual
preference’” but none had been enacted.99 At the time of the case, transgender
people were not included in proposed legislation to protect lesbian and gay
rights, and were generally marginalized in lesbian and gay rights
organizing.100 The Holloway court did not explain why it regarded
transsexuality as analogous to homosexuality, but it likely understood both
as deviations from normal sex roles. Marshalling medical evidence,
Holloway had argued that transsexualism was different from homosexuality
and transvestism because it “does not serve to change other views society has
about sexuality” and “there is nothing outwardly sexually unconventional
about a transsexual following surgery.”101 This argument is representative of
efforts at the time by the medical profession to “sanitize transsexuals” in
public opinion.102 Those efforts often ran up against accounts in the popular
press of transgender women engaged in sex work, stripping, or drag
performances.103 Against this background, it may have seemed obvious to the
Holloway court that the prohibition on sex discrimination did not extend to
“transsexuals.”
Thus, the Holloway court did not reason from the text of Title VII. It
departed from the text based on a flawed understanding of Title VII’s purpose
as protecting only men and women as classes. Concerns about immutability
and the stigmatization of cross-dressing and homosexuality constrained the
litigation from the outset by taking the argument that Holloway lost her job
as a result of her presumed “male” sex off the table. And medical
controversies in the late 1970s over whether “transsexuality” was the surgical
completion of “nature’s handiwork” or a psychotic delusion made the
analogy to discrimination against the religious convert a nonstarter.

98. Id. at 662 n.3.
99. Id. at 662. One such bill defined sexual preference as “having or manifesting an emotional
or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons of either gender, or having or
manifesting a preference for such attachment.” H.R. 5452, 94th Cong. (1975).
100. See, e.g., TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 88, at 28.
101. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 6–7. A dissenting judge argued that
transsexuality was distinct from sexual preference because of its biological nature. Holloway, 566
F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
102. Cf. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 194–96.
103. Id.
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B. Bennie Smith
One year after the Holloway case, the meaning of sex discrimination
came up in a second federal appellate case: the Fifth Circuit’s 1978 decision
in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance.104 The plaintiff in that case, Bennie
Smith, was a black man who applied for a job as a mail room clerk with
Liberty Mutual in 1969.105 Liberty Mutual did not dispute that Smith was
qualified for the job; indeed, the man who interviewed Smith thought he was
“over qualified,”106 perhaps due to his having an advanced degree in
philosophy.107 But the interviewer “did not recommend that the company hire
Smith because, in [the interviewer’s] opinion, Smith was effeminate.”108 In
particular, Smith had social “interests . . . not normally associated with
males”109 such as “[p]laying musical instruments, singing, dancing and
sewing.”110 As the district judge concluded, the interviewer thought Smith’s
effeminacy “gave evidence of the characteristics of sexual aberration.”111
Smith “most stringently denie[d] that he [was] a homosexual” and asserted
that he was a “happily married man.”112 He brought both race and sex
discrimination claims under Title VII. With respect to the sex discrimination
claim, Smith argued he was fired as a result of “sexual stereotypes.”113 The
Court of Appeals regarded Liberty Mutual’s reason for not hiring Smith to
be that Smith was “too womanly” rather than “because he was a male.” 114
While modern cases would view this as sex discrimination against a man for
behaving in ways women are allowed to, the Fifth Circuit in 1978 did not.115

104. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978).
105. Id. at 326.
106. Id. at 327 n.2. Smith believed that his interviewer, who was also a black man, did not hire
him “because he feared that I had better qualifications than he had, and would be a threat to him as
a Negro coworker.” Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17499, 1974 WL 10490, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 6, 1974), aff’d, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Smith’s EEOC charge).
107. Smith, 569 F.2d at 328 n.4.
108. Id. at 326.
109. Valdes, supra note 28, at 139 (quoting Brief for the Appellee at 9 n.7).
110. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1).
111. Smith, 569 F.2d at 328 n.4 (quoting the district judge).
112. Valdes, supra note 28, at 146 (quoting Brief for the Appellant, Bennie E. Smith at 17,
20 n.7). At the time, “married man” meant a man married to a woman.
113. Id. at 140 (quoting Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 as
arguing: “The sole issue presented . . . is whether the refusal to hire an applicant based on sexual
stereotypes amounts to unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
114. Smith, 569 F.2d at 327.
115. See infra Part II(A) (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Smith
also made a comparator argument: he pointed to a black female applicant who was hired despite
“presumably displaying effeminate characteristics.” Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp.
1098, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff’d, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978). The district court rejected this
argument, reasoning that because “the plaintiff, a male, displayed characteristics inappropriate to
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In explaining its reasoning, the Court of Appeals did not offer a
definition of “sex” or attempt to apply the statute’s terms. Instead, it asked
“whether a line can legitimately be drawn beyond which employer conduct
is no longer within the reach of the statute.”116 To find a place to draw the
line, it turned to Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,117 a 1975
case that held that employers could refuse to hire men with long hair. 118
Macon Telegraph believed that its clientele would disapprove of men with
long hair, because “longhaired youths” had developed a bad reputation at a
recent “counter-culture” music festival, where “scantily dressed young
women flooded the countryside;” “use of drugs and marijuana was open;”
and “[c]omplete nudity by both sexes, although not common was frequently
observed.”119 Plaintiff Alan Willingham argued it was sex discrimination to
hire women, but not men, with long hair.120 The original panel agreed with
this argument and held that the employer would have to prove that its sex
discrimination was justified under the statute’s BFOQ defense.121 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)122 and a number of district
courts had previously taken this approach.123 On this interpretation, an
employer did not have carte blanche to enforce different grooming rules as
to men and women—it had to demonstrate it had a reasonable need for such
discriminatory practices.124
In an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. It regarded the
discrimination against Willingham as a type of discrimination it termed “sex
plus”—discrimination against men with a particular “plus factor,” here, long
hair. It invented a special rule for sex plus discrimination: it is only prohibited
when the plus factor is an “immutable or protected characteristic.”125 That the
his sex” the right “counterpart” would “be[] a female applicant displaying inappropriate masculine
attributes.” Id.
116. Smith, 569 F.2d at 326.
117. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
118. Id. at 1090.
119. Id. at 1087 (quoting the original panel’s dissenting opinion).
120. Id. at 1088 (“[W]ere he a girl with identical length hair and comparable job qualifications,
he (she) would have been employed.”).
121. Id. The BFOQ defense allows discrimination where sex is a “bona fide occupational
qualification” that is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).
122. Id. at 1090; see also EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 1971 WL 3867, at *2 (Apr. 2, 1971).
123. See, e.g., Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 664–65 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. General
Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1056–57 (N.D. Ohio 1971). But see Baker v. California Land Title
Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
124. See, e.g., Roberts, 337 F. Supp. at 1056.
125. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). This
rule may have been an attempt by the Fifth Circuit to reconcile its holding with the Supreme Court’s
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text of the statute covers this situation was irrelevant to the court because it
thought that “[t]he beginning (and often the ending) point of statutory
interpretation is an exploration of the legislative history of the Act in
question.”126 And yet, the court found the legislative history of Title VII’s
sex provision to be “meager.”127 Based on the false assumption that the
legislative history revealed nothing, the Fifth Circuit guessed that “Congress
in all probability did not intend for its proscription of sexual discrimination
to have significant and sweeping implications.”128 Thus, it rationalized, Title
VII could not have been intended “to limit an employer’s right to exercise his
informed judgment as to how best to run his shop.”129 The court imagined
that Title VII’s purpose was only to equalize the employment opportunities
of men and women as groups,130 not to “maximiz[e] individual freedom by

decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971). That case was a short per
curiam opinion in which the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit for its mistaken reading of Title VII as
allowing an employer policy that excluded women with school-age children, but not men with
school-age children. Id. at 544 (holding that any such policy had to be justified under the statute’s
BFOQ defense). A concurrence by Justice Marshall explained that, by adding sex to the Civil Rights
Act, Congress “intended to prevent employers from refusing ‘to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes’” and made clear that “[e]ven characterizations of the
proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as predicates for restricting employment
opportunity.” Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring). It is possible that the Willingham court regarded
having small children as a “protected characteristic[]” unlike hair length.
126. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090 (emphasis added).
127. Id. To support this conclusion, the court cited two student notes and one earlier Fifth
Circuit case, Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971). Willingham,
507 F.2d at 1090. But rather than concluding the sex amendment’s purpose was inscrutable, Diaz
reasoned that the statutory text made clear that its purpose was “to provide equal access to the job
market for both men and women” and to “achieve the optimum use of our labor resources” in a way
that “would enable individuals to develop as individuals.” Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386–87 (holding that
an airline could not refuse to hire men as flight attendants).
128. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. But see supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (citing
sources discussing how the sex amendment passed over the opposition that it would have significant
and sweeping implications). The Holloway court also relied on Willingham for its flawed
understanding of the sex amendment’s history. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
662 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090).
129. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092.
130. For this idea, the Fifth Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent on how a facially neutral
practice may be discriminatory if it has a disparate impact on a minority group. Id. at 1091 (citing
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)). But it was contrary to Supreme Court
precedent to apply the disparate impact test to a facially discriminatory practice. See Griggs, 401
U.S. at 429, 431 (noting the statute already “proscribe[d] . . . overt discrimination” and practices
that were not “fair in form”). In Martin Marietta, the Court struck down the employer’s facially
discriminatory rule excluding women, but not men, with small children, despite the fact that the rule
had no disparate impact on women as a group. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545
(1971). In that case, women were overrepresented in the position. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting the employer’s argument that “while 70 to 75 percent of those
who applied for this position were women, 75 to 80 percent of those holding the positions were
women”), vacated, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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eliminating sexual stereotypes.”131 It did not think that hair length regulations
had any significant effects on the overall employment opportunities of men
or women as groups.132 In its short opinion rejecting Bennie Smith’s claim,
the Fifth Circuit saw itself as simply “adher[ing] to the conclusion in
Willingham.”133
At the time of Willingham and Smith, it was clear from the text and
history of Title VII that the statute’s sole purpose was not equalizing group
conditions. In April 1978, three months after Smith, the Supreme Court made
it all the more clear in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart.134 Manhart was a class action brought by female employees
challenging a policy that required women to make larger contributions to the
employer’s pension fund than men.135 The reason the employer asked women
to pay more in contributions was actuarial data that showed women live
longer than men.136 The pension fund made monthly payments from the time
of retirement until the time of death. Thus, women, who lived longer, would
end up taking out more money in benefits.137 The Supreme Court held that
even though the policy equalized conditions for women and men as groups,
it was impermissible discrimination.138 The Court explained this result was
required by the text of the statute:
The question . . . is whether the existence or nonexistence of
“discrimination” is to be determined by comparison of class
characteristics or individual characteristics. A “stereotyped” answer to
that question may not be the same as the answer that the language and
purpose of the statute command. The statute makes it unlawful “to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.

131. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092.
132. Id. (“Neither sex is elevated by these regulations to an appreciably higher occupational
level than the other. We conclude that Title VII never was intended to encompass sexual
classifications having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities.” (quoting Dodge
v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973))). This interpretation was based solely
on the term “because of . . . sex”; the court noted the term “discriminate” could not do any work to
preclude Willingham’s claim, on account of “persuasive legislative evidence that the word
‘discriminate’ is to be construed broadly under the Act.” Id. at 1088, 1093 n.3 (citing 110 CONG.
REC. 7213 (1964)).
133. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978).
134. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978).
135. Id. at 704.
136. Id. at 705.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 708.
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§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute’s focus on the
individual is unambiguous.139
While it was true that some women would live longer than men, some
would not. Those who would not were “receiv[ing] smaller paychecks
because of their sex” with “no compensating advantage.”140 The Court held
this was unlawful, just as it would have been unlawful for an employer to
charge different rates based on actuarial data showing that life expectancies
differ based on race or national origin.141 The purpose of the statute was to
make these traits “irrelevant.”142 The Court explained: “In forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”143
But even if Manhart had been decided before Smith’s appeal, it is likely
that the Fifth Circuit would still have denied his claim due to then-prevailing
prejudices about homosexuality. It framed the question in the case as whether
Title VII allows discrimination based on “affectional or sexual preference,”
a question it blurred together with whether discrimination was allowed based
on Smith’s “effeminacy.”144 This blurring reflects a misunderstanding of
same-sex desire as necessarily correlating with the “inversion” of any number
of gendered personality traits.145 Although it relied entirely on Willingham,
the court offered no explanation for why Bennie Smith’s presumed
homosexuality was not an immutable or protected characteristic. Readers
today might bristle at the comparison between a long-haired white hippie like
Willingham, who the court characterized as seeking to “maximiz[e]

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 709.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 n.13 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
144. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978) (failing to explain
this conflation). The court claimed it was Smith who argued sexual preference was covered under
Title VII, repeating an assertion that had been made by the district court. Id. But according to
Professor Valdes, Smith’s briefs had “repeatedly tried to stress that his claim was not about sexual
orientation and that, in any event, he was a happily-married, albeit socially gender-atypical, member
of the sexual majority.” Valdes, supra note 28, at 146.
145. This was an outdated understanding even in 1978. See, e.g., George Chauncey, Jr. From
Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality, 58/59 SALMAGUNDI 114, 116 (1983) (discussing the nineteenth
century concept of “sexual inversion,” which “referred to a broad range of deviant gender behavior,
of which homosexual desire was only a logical but indistinct aspect”); Valdes, supra note 28, at 44–
45 (discussing the “sexual inversion” theory of Victorian-era sexologists).
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individual freedom by eliminating sexual stereotypes,”146 and Bennie Smith,
a black man with an advanced degree who could not get a job as a mail room
clerk because of his presumed sexual orientation.147
But at the time of the Smith decision, “homosexuality,” rather than long
hair, may have seemed the more likely reason to deny Title VII protection.
The Smith court cited a 1975 EEOC ruling concluding that the term “sex,”
while
not
defined
in
Title
VII,
means
“gender,
an
immutable . . . characteristic with which a person is born.”148 The EEOC held
that discharge of a man due to “homosexual tendencies” was on account of
his “sexual practices” rather than his “male gender.”149 The EEOC did not
ask whether the man would have been hired had he been a woman who
engaged in those same sexual practices. The concept of immutability did the
conceptual work to obscure this question. While a person is blameless for
being born a man or a woman, they are at fault for their “practices.”
To put these events in historical context, “[b]etween 1967 and 1996,
authoritative Supreme Court decisions advised Congress and state
legislatures that homosexual or bisexual persons could be treated as per se
‘afflicted with psychopathic personality’ and that private nonprocreative
sexual acts between consenting same-sex couples could be criminalized as
felonies.”150 At the time of Smith, the U.S. military regarded “homosexual
tendencies” as a disqualifying moral defect.151 Media coverage of
“homosexuality” in the 1970s was, by in large, “negative—highlighting
medical theories that emphasized pathology, reporting police campaigns
against ‘deviants,’ or casting pitying glances at the lives of sexual
outlaws.”152
The Smith decision thus resulted from the unstated understanding that
male “effeminacy” equates with “homosexuality,” and that neither are
immutable or normatively acceptable traits that employers should be required
to ignore. The Smith decision rested on an understanding of Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision as limited to the purpose of equalizing the

146. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 482 F.2d 535, 536 (5th Cir. 1973), opinion vacated
on reh’g, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing Willingham as “a twenty-two year old white
male and an artist by trade” with “shoulder length” hair).
147. See Smith, 569 F.2d at 326–27.
148. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Dec. No. 76-67 (1975), 1975 WL 4475,
at *2.
149. Id. (emphasis in original).
150. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 332–33 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)).
151. See, e.g., RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY 105 (1993) (discussing how the military constructed homosexuality as a national security
threat based on the unfounded view that “perverts” would be disloyal).
152. JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 319 (3d ed. 2012).
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employment opportunities of men and women as groups, not protecting
individuals against sex-role stereotypes. It was not based on Title VII’s text;
it openly disregarded the statutory text.
C. The Legacy of Holloway and Smith
Despite the errors of Holloway and Smith, later appellate decisions
viewed the two cases as standing for the well-established proposition that
Congress did not intend to prohibit discrimination based on “transsexualism”
and “homosexuality.” Based on this premise, courts rejected any new theories
that would explain how discrimination based on sexual orientation or
transgender identity was a type of sex discrimination as illegitimate
“bootstrapping” of unprotected groups into Title VII. While courts began to
profess that they did not condone these forms of discrimination, their
opinions continued to evince misunderstandings and prejudices. In cases
brought by transgender women, courts fixated on the irrelevant questions of
whether the plaintiffs were really women, or whether transgender identity
was natural or disordered, rather than asking whether the plaintiffs were fired
because of sex.
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit decided DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,153 a case brought by gay and lesbian workers.154 The plaintiffs
alleged they had been mistreated on the basis of sex because “if a male
employee prefers males as sexual partners, he will be treated differently from
a female who prefers male partners” and vice versa.155 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument. Unlike the Smith and Holloway courts, it did not offer
an interpretation of the statute that required a plaintiff to show a sex-based
practice had a disparate impact on men or women as a group. To the contrary,
it rejected the plaintiff’s disparate impact argument that anti-gay
discrimination harmed men as a class more than women as class, on the
ground that the theory was an illegitimate attempt to “‘bootstrap’ Title VII
protection for homosexuals” in contravention of congressional intent to
exclude them.156 The court’s conclusions about congressional intent were

153. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256
F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 330–31.
155. Id. at 331. The court rejected the individualized logic of this argument and reframed the
comparison in terms of group equality: “whether dealing with men or women the employer is using
the same criterion: it will not hire or promote a person who prefers sexual partners of the same sex.”
Id.
156. Id. at 331. The plaintiffs’ disparate impact argument was “that discrimination against
homosexuals disproportionately affects men both because of the greater incidence of homosexuality
in the male population and because of the greater likelihood of an employer’s discovering male
homosexuals compared to female homosexuals.” Id. at 330. Over a dissent, the court refused to
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based entirely on Holloway, which it quoted at length.157 The DeSantis court
also rejected the claim of one plaintiff who had been fired because his
employer “felt that it was inappropriate for a male teacher to wear an earring
to school.”158 The court cited Smith for the proposition that “discrimination
because of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality . . . or
transsexualism (Holloway), does not fall within the purview of Title VII.”159
Unlike Holloway and Smith, DeSantis included the caveat that “we do
not express approval of an employment policy that differentiates according
to sexual preference.”160 But by the time of DeSantis, negative views about
homosexual and transgender identity were baked into the doctrine, along with
the mistaken beliefs about congressional intent that the Holloway and Smith
courts employed to override the statutory text. Taking for granted Holloway
and Smith’s holdings, later courts rejected textual arguments on the ground
that any interpretation that led to “protection for homosexuals” had to be
foreclosed as illegitimate bootstrapping.161 The use of the term
“homosexuals” hints that it was this particular minority group, not sexual
orientation generally, that courts thought Congress could not have intended
to protect.
Holloway also had a strong pull on the 1982 Eighth Circuit case,
Sommers v. Budget Marketing,162 where the court transfigured the question
of sex discrimination into one about which restroom a transgender plaintiff
should use. In Sommers, the plaintiff Audra Sommers described herself as “a
psychological female with anatomical features of a male.”163 She was hired
to do clerical work by Budget Marketing, where she presented as a woman
and worked for three days without complaint, until a former acquaintance
who had known her as a man raised questions about her “sexual status.” 164
Budget fired Sommers on the ground that “she misrepresented herself as an
allow the plaintiffs to pursue this theory due to concerns that it would “‘bootstrap’ Title VII
protection for homosexuals under the guise of protecting men generally.” Id.
157. Id. at 329 (addressing congressional intent by quoting three paragraphs from Holloway).
158. Id. at 331. According to Professor Valdes, the plaintiff’s attorney in that case “was not sure
whether the employer actually knew or even suspected his client’s homosexuality.” Valdes, supra
note 28, at 155 (citing the author’s November 19, 1993 telephone interview with plaintiff Donald
Strailey’s attorney, Richard Gayer). The attorney thought that the defendant—a nursery school—
was concerned that parents would assume his client was gay based on “‘his effeminate image.’” Id.
The earring was “‘the last straw.’” Id.
159. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 332.
160. Id. at 331.
161. Id.
162. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
163. Id. at 750 n.2 (describing a “medical affidavit” submitted by Sommers).
164. This fact is drawn from Sommer’s parallel state-court case. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 471, 474 (Iowa 1983) (holding that the prohibition on sex discrimination
in Iowa’s Civil Rights Act did not “include transsexuals”).

2019]

How Circuit Precedent Got Title VII Wrong

107

anatomical female when she applied for the job” and caused disruption after
female employees threatened to quit if Sommers were permitted to use the
women’s restroom.165 The court held that transsexuals—who are
psychologically one sex and anatomically the other—were outside the “plain
meaning” of the term “sex,” defined as male or female.166 But this reasoning
did not drive the result in the case. Rather than seeing Sommers’s sexual
identity as outside Title VII’s scope, the district court recognized that “for
the purposes of Title VII,” Sommers was “male because she is an anatomical
male.”167 This factual finding should have led the court to conclude Sommers
was indeed fired because of her sex. Sommers’s status as an “anatomical
male” was the explicit reason she was fired. Had she been an “anatomical
female,” she would have kept her job.
But the court was not asking the question the statute asks: whether
Sommers was discharged because of her sex. Rather, it was addressing a
different question: whether she was properly classified by her employer for
purposes of restroom usage. Echoing the district court, the Eighth Circuit
explained:
We are not unmindful of the problem Sommers faces. On the other
hand, Budget faces a problem in protecting the privacy interests of its
female employees. According to affidavits submitted to the district
court, even medical experts disagree as to whether Sommers is
properly classified as male or female. The appropriate remedy is not
immediately apparent to this court. Should Budget allow Sommers to
use the female restroom, the male restroom, or one for Sommers’s own
use?168
The court expressed its wish that some “reasonable accommodation”
could be worked out by the parties but held it was constrained to decide only
“whether Congress intended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to protect
transsexuals from discrimination.”169 With respect to the restroom dilemma,
Title VII offers the BFOQ defense for employers who wish to justify sex
classifications on business grounds. Instead of asking whether this defense
applied, a restroom dilemma resulted in a rule giving employers carte blanche
to fire transgender workers.
A less sympathetic view of transgender identity drove the result in the
Seventh Circuit’s 1983 decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines.170 The plaintiff
165. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748–49.
166. Id. at 750.
167. Id. at 749.
168. Id. at 750; see also id. at 749 (quoting the district court’s concerns about which restroom
the plaintiff should use).
169. Id. at 750.
170. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
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in that case, Karen Ulane, worked as a First Officer and flight instructor with
Eastern Airlines, after a decorated career as an Army pilot.171 The airline fired
Ulane as a result of her transition, arguing that she was not fit to fly on
account of transsexuality, a psychological problem, and because no one knew
what effects her medical treatments might have.172 After a bench trial, the
district judge concluded: “There is no evidence of any rational belief on the
part of Eastern that there is a safety problem,” and that Eastern’s real issue
was the perception that “the respectability of aviation is compromised by the
presence of a transsexual” as a pilot.173
The district judge thought that discharge on the basis of transsexuality
was because of sex for two reasons, one literal and one scientific.174 The
literal argument was based on his “layman’s reaction to the simple word,”
“sex,” which “literally applies to transsexuals.”175 Rather than speculating
about legislative intent, the judge reasoned that he was bound to “work[] with
the word that the Congress gave us.”176 He concluded both that Ulane was
fired for transsexuality, and also that she was in fact “female” and had lost
her job “because of her sex.”177
The scientific argument was based on medical testimony at trial that
“sex” encompasses a psychological component called “sexual identity.”178
While cast in scientific terms, the dispute was about the immutability of
transgender identity, a concept with moral heft. If Ulane had been a
transvestite—a man who wore women’s attire for purposes of sexual
gratification—there was no argument that she would have been covered by
Title VII.179 Medical professionals of the era distinguished “bona fide
171. Id. at 1082–83.
172. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 827–29 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1984).
173. Id. at 832 (characterizing the testimony of Eastern’s witnesses).
174. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084 (characterizing the district court’s opinion).
175. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 822, 825.
176. Id. at 825; see Chai Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All About Gender?,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 641 (2000) (explaining that Judge Grady was “more concerned
with what the statute actually meant, than with what Congress intended it to mean”).
177. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 839. This finding was based on her “post operative legal status.”
Id. The state of Illinois and the Federal Aviation Administration had recognized Ulane as female.
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
178. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825.
179. Id. at 823 (“[T]he statute was not intended and cannot reasonably be argued to have been
intended to cover the matter of sexual preference, the preference of a sexual partner, or the matter
of sexual gratification from wearing the clothes of the opposite sex.”). At the time of Ulane, the
Illinois Supreme Court had held that laws that forbade cross-dressing were unconstitutional, but
only as applied to transsexual individuals. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 523, 525
(1978). Ulane’s expert witness testified that transvestites, unlike transsexuals, engaged in crossdressing for purposes of “sexual arousal.” See Richard Green, Spelling ‘Relief’ for Transsexuals:
Employment Discrimination and the Criteria of Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 128 (1985). In
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transsexuals” from sexual “deviants.”180 It is apparent from the district
judge’s opinion that he came to sympathize with Ulane over the course of the
bench trial.181 The judge remarked that Ulane’s transition was not undertaken
lightly and came at great personal cost.182 Rather than having a “freakish”
appearance, she was indistinguishable from a “biological woman.”183 As a
“true transsexual,” she was protected by Title VII.184
The Seventh Circuit reversed in an opinion that suggests it could not
help but see Karen Ulane as “freakish.” The court began its opinion by
remarking that Ulane’s transition “may give some cause to pause”—an
acknowledgment that readers might be unfamiliar or uncomfortable with
transgender people.185 It then proceeded to tell Ulane’s “story” as if to those
disbelieving readers.186 Rather than remarking on the social aspects and
challenges of Ulane’s transition as the district judge had done, the Seventh
Circuit described her medical treatments in intimate and irrelevant detail.187
The circuit court referred to “transsexuality” as a “diagnosis.”188 It defined
“transsexualism” as a person who “experiences discomfort or discontent
about nature’s choice of his or her particular sex.”189 “Nature’s choice” was
the court’s paraphrase of the Third Edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, which did not use this
freighted language.190 The court expressed outright skepticism about surgical
a law review article, Ulane’s expert witness argued that “behavioral science data demonstrate that
there is nothing ‘voluntary’ about sexual or gender identity. Only sexual anatomy is mutable.” Id.
at 138–39. The district judge agreed. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 823.
180. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 168, 196; see also TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 88, at 17.
181. See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 823 (“Prior to my participation in this case, I would have had
no doubt that the question of sex was a very straightforward matter of whether you are male or
female.”).
182. Id. at 826.
183. Id. at 827 (noting she appeared to her psychiatrists to be indistinguishable from a
“biological woman,” with “nothing flamboyant” or “freakish” about her). The judge also noted that
she had adjusted to the transition, and was even elected “vice president of her church . . . by coparishioners who know of her situation.” Id. This observation reflects the problematic view that the
“intelligibility of one’s new gender in the eyes of non-trans people” is the “the favored indication
of ‘success’” for treatment. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 26, 28 (2003) (“While some [trans people] do rely on passing as non-trans women
or men in various aspects of their lives, and some embrace non-trans male or female identity, I think
that all are disserved by the requirement that trans people exhibit hyper-masculine or hyperfeminine characteristics to get through medical gatekeeping.”).
184. See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 827.
185. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1083.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1083 n.3 (emphasis added).
190. DSM-3, supra note 39, at 261–64 (cited in Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3). The one medical
text cited by the Ulane court on the definition of transsexuality—while less hostile than that cited
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procedures that would override “nature’s choice,” remarking that “even if
one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what remains of a
man, that does not decide this case.”191
This skepticism reflected a line of popular opinion at the time that there
was something disturbingly unnatural about such surgeries. In 1978, feminist
theologian Mary Daly had likened transsexual women to Frankenstein’s
monster.192 Deploying similar imagery, Janice Raymond’s 1979 book, The
Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male, argued that “the problem
of transsexuality would best be served by morally mandating it out of
existence.”193 Today such arguments and terms like “she-male” are
recognized as dehumanizing and offensive,194 but in 1979, Raymond’s book
received positive coverage in the New York Times.195 By the mid-1980s, there

by the Holloway court—is still offensive by today’s standards. See Milton T. Edgerton, Jr., et al.,
Psychological Considerations of Gender Reassignment Surgery, 9 SYMP. ON SOC. & PSYCHOL.
CONSIDERATIONS PLASTIC SURGERY 355, 355 (1982) (discussing how prejudices in the medical
profession “have tended to obscure the fact that all transsexuals are desperate and lonesome people”)
(cited in Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3). The article divided “male transsexual patients” into two
categories—reliable and manipulative—describing the manipulative group as “exemplified by the
flamboyant, ‘hysterical’ males dressed in seductive female clothing” and “prone to antisocial
behavior.” Id. at 364.
191. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (“Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity
she desires.” (emphasis added)). I am not the first legal scholar to criticize this passage. See Susan
Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 347 (1999) (“The passage is brimming with the language of skepticism.”);
Ronald Garet, Self-Transformability, 65 S. CALIF. L. REV. 121, 197 (1991) (“In these words, more
than a trace is to be found, if not of disgust, then at least of distaste.”). But these criticisms bear
repeating.
192. See Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix:
Performing Transgender Rage, 1 GLQ: J. LESBIAN AND GAY STUD. 237, 238 (1994) (discussing
MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM 69–72 (1978)).
193. JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE 178
(1979); see also STRYKER, supra note 24, at 132 (discussing the impact of Raymond’s arguments
that transgender women were appropriating women’s bodies and invading their spaces in the mid1980s). Raymond accused transsexual women of engaging in “sexual deception” which she equated
with rape. See Talia Mae Bettcher, Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence
and the Politics of Illusion, 22 HYPATIA 43, 56–57 (2007) (explaining how the argument that sexual
deception is a form of metaphorical rape has been used to justify the actual rape of transgender
people).
194. See Michelle Goldberg, What Is A Woman?, NEW YORKER (July 28, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2
[https://perma.cc/MMN4-8W9B]
(“It’s a measure of how much perceptions have changed in the past thirty-five years that ‘The
Transsexual Empire’ received a respectful, even admiring hearing in the mainstream media.”).
195. See, e.g., id.; Thomas Szasz, Male and Female Created He Them, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
1979),
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/06/10/archives/male-and-female-created-he-them-tran
sexual.html [https://perma.cc/G92U-DNDQ] (describing Raymond’s support for her thesis as
“flawless” and observing “[i]n the old days, when I was a medical student, if a man wanted to have
his penis amputated, my psychology professors said that he suffered from schizophrenia, locked
him up in an asylum and threw away the key”).
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had been a “barrage of negative publicity” around surgical interventions for
transgender patients, and one prominent treatment program at Johns Hopkins
had closed, prompting insurance carriers to deny coverage for treatments.196
In the words of one physician, carriers were using the closure of the Johns
Hopkins program “to justify considering transsexuals freaks and frauds
again.”197
In Ulane, the Seventh Circuit emptily professed that it did “not condone
discrimination in any form,” but nonetheless concluded it was “constrained
to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.”198 Ulane interpreted Title
VII as barring discrimination “against women because they are women and
against men because they are men.”199 By this, the court meant that to prevail,
Ulane would have to show that Eastern Airlines thought she was female and
fired her because it generally “treated females less favorably than males.”200
But Eastern Airlines fired Ulane because it considered her to be “a biological
male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered
parts of her body to make it appear to be female.”201 The district judge thought
it was literal sex discrimination to fire Ulane because of her female “sexual
identity.”202 But the circuit court believed Ulane was fired not for her sexual
identity, but for having a “sexual identity disorder” defined as a condition in
which “a person born with a male body . . . believes himself to be female.”203
The court’s skepticism of this “untraditional and unusual” disorder left it
unwilling to allow Ulane’s claim without a new law from Congress
specifically instructing it to do so.204
These early cases—Holloway, Smith, DeSantis, Sommers, and Ulane—
were premised not on the statutory text but rather on misunderstandings,
judgments, and fears; the conflation of transgender identities, homosexuality,
and gender nonconformity; mistakes about congressional intent; and
judicially invented limitations on the statute to only group rights or
immutable characteristics. These precedents set in place formidable barriers
to change. Later circuit court decisions simply relied on them for their
196. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 74, at 269–70.
197. Id. (quoting Mark Bowden, A Squabble Over Sex Change Operations, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, March 24, 1980, at 2A).
198. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
199. Id. at 1085; see Clarke, supra note 10, at 103 (arguing that this interpretation is not
supported by the text of Title VII, is contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and is inconsistent with
any plausible normative theory of the harm of employment discrimination).
200. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
201. Id. Ulane did not argue she was fired because she was perceived to be a “biological male,”
likely for similar reasons as Ramona Holloway. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
202. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825.
203. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 1086.
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holdings, updating references to “homosexuality” to the more neutralsounding “sexual orientation.”205 Few new arguments were made, other than
additional negative inferences from the continued failure of legislative
proposals to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.206 The antibootstrapping point from DeSantis—that Congress meant to exclude any
theory that amounts to a claim that discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality is sex discrimination—foreclosed the development of legal
theories that might have undermined the old cases.207
III. How Circuit Courts Got It Right
The early circuit cases got Title VII wrong because they understood
“homosexual” and “transsexual” people to be deviant social classes, different
from the men and women the statute was intended to protect. Even as
attitudes about LGBTQ208 people softened, the errors of the early cases were
buried under the accumulated sediment of precedent. As a result of a number
of developments, those errors have been unearthed, and recent circuit court
decisions now apply Title VII’s text to forbid anti-LGBTQ discrimination.
This Part will discuss four of these developments: (1) the Supreme Court’s
1989 Price Waterhouse decision holding that Title VII forbids discrimination
against individuals for failing to conform with sex-role stereotypes, (2) the
rise of textualism as an approach to statutory interpretation, (3) the
normalization of LGBTQ identities, and (4) the loosening of the assumption
that employers must enforce distinctions between the sexes in the workplace.

205. See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (refusing to
depart from a brief statement in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) that
“[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is clear, however, that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (extending Ulane to sexual orientation), overruled by Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e regard it as settled law that, as drafted
and authoritatively construed, Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual
orientation.” (quoting Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 1996)));
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”).
206. See, e.g., Bibby, 260 F.3d at 261.
207. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Like other
courts, we have therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to
‘bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.’”), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
764 (6th Cir. 2006) (same).
208. I use this common acronym to describe any person who (a) is not exclusively heterosexual
or (b) does not exclusively identify with the gender associated with the sex they were assigned at
birth. I do not intend to exclude those who use other terms to self-identify, nor am I attempting to
delimit the broader social movement with this choice of acronym.
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None of these developments changed what it means to “discharge” an
“individual . . . because of” their “sex.”209 Rather, they removed the blinders,
allowing courts to understand the application of that text to LGBTQ workers.
A. Sex Stereotyping Doctrine
A first development was the Supreme Court’s 1989 Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins210 decision holding that Title VII forbids discrimination against
individuals for failing to conform with sex-role stereotypes. This antistereotyping rule undercut the group-rights logic of the early cases: first with
respect to men deemed effeminate, then to transgender plaintiffs, and then to
plaintiffs fired due to their sexual orientations.
The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, was a cisgender211
woman denied a promotion at an accounting firm.212 Hopkins was told that
she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that her swearing was
objectionable “because it’s a lady using foul language,” and that if she wanted
to make partner, she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.”213 The Supreme Court held that under Title VII, an employer could
not deny opportunities to a woman based on “stereotypical notions about
women’s proper deportment.”214 The Court clarified: “As for the legal
relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group.”215 Manhart had already held that an employer
could not discriminate against an individual woman by assuming she
matched the stereotype for her group.216 Price Waterhouse made it
undeniable that employers could not discriminate by insisting women match
the stereotype associated with their group.217 Two years after the decision,
Congress amended Title VII to clarify that discrimination is unlawful even if

209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
210. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
211. I use this term to mean she was not transgender.
212. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
213. Id. at 235.
214. Id. at 256.
215. Id. at 251 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion agreed with the four
Justices in the plurality on this point. Id. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing that there had
“been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly what Title VII forbids”).
216. See Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 406 (2014).
217. Id. This version of the sex stereotyping idea was not a new one; as Justice Marshall
explained in his 1971 concurrence in Martin Marietta, it is to be found in the Civil Rights Act’s
legislative history. See supra note 125.
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“sex” is just one “motivating factor,” making it easier for victims of
discrimination to bring claims where the employer had mixed motives.218
Because Title VII protects men as well as women, there was no way to
reconcile Price Waterhouse with the holdings of Smith and DeSantis that
Title VII allows discrimination against “effeminate” men.219 In a 1997 case,
Doe v. City of Belleville,220 a sixteen-year-old boy was harassed by his
straight male coworkers, including one who called him a “fag,” “queer,” and
“his ‘bitch’”; told him to “go back to San Francisco”; threatened to rape him;
and at one point, grabbed him by the testicles, saying he needed to find out
whether Doe was “a boy or a girl.”221 Doe was heterosexual; it appears his
coworkers targeted him because he wore an earring.222 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that this harassment would obviously be unlawful if Doe were a
woman and if it “were triggered by that woman’s decision to wear overalls
and a flannel shirt to work.”223 The differences between Doe and Price
Waterhouse were “immaterial.”224 An earring was the reason one of the male
plaintiffs in DeSantis had been fired two decades earlier.225 In 2001, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that Price Waterhouse had overruled DeSantis to the
extent that the case had held that a male nursery school teacher could be fired
because he was perceived as effeminate.226
In the words of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Price Waterhouse
“eviscerated” the logic of Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane,227 making success
possible on sex discrimination claims for transgender plaintiffs.228 In Smith

218. See supra note 2 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)). The 1991 amendment
was motivated by the Price Waterhouse decision but did not disturb its holding on sex stereotypes;
rather, supporters of the amendment endorsed the sex-stereotyping rule. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra
note 4, at 374–76.
219. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158,
1180 (1991); Case, supra note 9, at 43–44; Valdes, supra note 28, at 178.
220. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). The decision was vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
523 U.S. 75, (1998), but the parties settled the matter before an opinion could be issued on remand.
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[i]t would
seem, however, that the gender stereotypes holding of City of Belleville was not disturbed” by
Oncale).
221. Doe, 119 F.3d at 567.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 568.
224. Id. at 581.
225. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
226. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
227. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004).
228. The first of these appellate decisions was Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
2000), a case under the Gender Motivated Violence Act—a law that provides a cause of action for
certain violent crimes motivated by “gender.” Id. at 1198. The court reasoned that the term “gender”
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v. City of Salem, the plaintiff was a firefighter, “biologically and by birth a
male,” who began to present at work as a woman after being diagnosed with
“Gender Identity Disorder.”229 This caused Smith’s coworkers to complain
that “his appearance and mannerisms were not ‘masculine enough,’” leading
eventually to his suspension.230 Smith claimed to be “male” for Title VII
purposes, and argued that “he” would not have suffered discrimination “on
account of his non-masculine behavior and [Gender Identity Disorder], had
he been a woman instead of a man.”231 The Sixth Circuit agreed, reasoning
that Price Waterhouse bars discrimination against a plaintiff for failing to
“act and/or identify with his or her gender.”232 It explained that after Price
Waterhouse, “employers who discriminate against men because
they . . . wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely,
are . . . engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not
occur but for the victim’s sex.”233 Early courts had overlooked these
arguments because they were distracted by the fact that plaintiffs were
“transsexual.”234 Those courts had “superimpose[d] classifications such as
‘transsexual’ on a plaintiff, and then legitimize[d] discrimination based on
the plaintiff’s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into
an ostensibly unprotected classification.”235
Over the next decade, the EEOC236 and most appellate courts that
considered the issue came to agree that discrimination on the basis of
transgender status was a type of sex stereotyping.237 The plaintiff in Smith
was “interchangeable” with the term “sex,” drawing on Price Waterhouse to conclude that
discrimination against a transgender woman met the terms of the statute. Id. at 1202.
229. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 570.
232. Id. at 575. Later decisions debated whether Smith held that discrimination on the basis of
transgender status was necessarily unlawful. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 577 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
In 2018, the Sixth Circuit explicitly held that it was. Id. (“[W]e now directly hold: Title VII protects
transgender persons because of their transgender or transitioning status, because transgender or
transitioning status constitutes an inherently gender non-conforming trait.”).
233. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
234. See supra note 86–98 and accompanying text.
235. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
236. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *8 (Apr. 20, 2012).
237. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017) (“By
definition, a transgender individual does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he
or she was assigned at birth.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A person
is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses
gender stereotypes.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that
discrimination against a transgender woman was “motivated, at least in part, by [her] gender—in
this case, by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or
demeanor”). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding
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proceeded on the theory that “he” was an insufficiently masculine “male,”
akin to the cisgender male plaintiff harassed in Doe. The argument that
transgender women are “female” for Title VII purposes also had some
success.238 In other cases by transgender women raising the sex stereotyping
theory, courts have concluded it is immaterial whether the plaintiff is
proceeding as male or female for Title VII purposes.239 What matters is that
the discriminator targeted the plaintiff because she was perceived to be an
“insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an
inherently gender-nonconforming [transgender individual].”240
Price Waterhouse also paved the way for sex discrimination cases
brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs. After Price Waterhouse, it proved
exceedingly difficult for courts to sort out when discrimination against
lesbian and gay plaintiffs was based on sexual orientation and when it was
based on sex. To avoid “bootstrapping” protection for sexual orientation into
Title VII, courts attempted to draw a line between sex stereotypes about
“appearance or behaviors,” which could give rise to a sex discrimination
claim, and sex stereotypes about “sexual practices,” which could not.241 This
resulted in a bizarre set of lower court opinions in which gay and lesbian
plaintiffs who did not conform to sex stereotypes in “observable ways,” for
example, with their haircuts or attire, won, while those who were fired just

that a plaintiff “may not claim protection under Title VII based upon her transsexuality per se”
without resolving whether the plaintiff had a sex-stereotyping claim).
238. See United States v. Se. Okla. State Univ., No. CIV-15-324-C, 2015 WL 4606079, at *2
(W.D. Okla. July 10, 2015) (“Here, it is clear that Defendants’ actions as alleged by Dr. Tudor
occurred because she was female, yet Defendants regarded her as male. Thus, the actions Dr. Tudor
alleges Defendants took against her were based upon their dislike of her presented gender.”); cf.
Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. College Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954,
at *2, *3 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “neither a
woman with male genitalia nor a man with stereotypically female anatomy, such as breasts, may be
deprived of a benefit or privilege of employment by reason of that nonconforming trait” but
concluding that it is permissible for an employer to segregate its restrooms “by genitalia”).
239. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that a transgender plaintiff “established that he was a member of a protected class by alleging
discrimination against the City for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes” and that the plaintiff
had standing because he was “a member of a protected class—whether as a man or a woman”).
240. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008). The employer’s motives
are what matter. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 573 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding it was sex discrimination for an employer to fire a
transgender woman “simply because she refused to conform to the [employer’s] notion of her sex”),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“What matters . . . is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of
the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed that the
victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one.”).
241. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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for identifying as gay lost.242 In 2016, a Seventh Circuit panel observed that
no one in Congress “would be satisfied with a body of case law that protects
‘flamboyant’ gay men and ‘butch’ lesbians but not the lesbian or gay
employee who acts and appears straight.”243 That panel “described the line
between a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation
as gossamer-thin.”244
When the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc, it concluded the line
“does not exist at all,” becoming the first federal appellate court to hold that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex discrimination.245 Price
Waterhouse’s anti-stereotyping rule extended logically to forbid employers
from enforcing stereotypes about who men and women should partner with.
The Seventh Circuit explained: “a policy that discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation does not affect every woman, or every man, but it is based
on assumptions about the proper behavior for someone of a given
sex. . . . Any discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the fact that
the complainant—woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or
dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on
sex.”246 The EEOC had already taken the position that sexual orientation
discrimination is a type of sex discrimination in 2015,247 and the Second
Circuit followed suit in 2018.248

242. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 715, 718 (2014) (surveying court decisions).
243. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 715 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc 853 F.3d
339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017). Professor Soucek’s article had raised this concern. Soucek, supra note
242, at 786–87.
244. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 346–47; see also Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir.
2017) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that Price Waterhouse’s
rejection of discrimination by employers “‘insisting that [employees] matched the stereotype
associated with their group’—opened a whole new avenue for Title VII claims”).
247. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 15,
2015) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 241–42 (1989)).
248. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). In Zarda, Judge Katzman recognized that “stereotypes about
homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the proper roles of men and
women. . . . The gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men should date women, and not other
men.” Id. at 121 (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)). This portion
of Judge Katzman’s majority opinion was joined by five other judges, for a total of six out of the
thirteen-member panel.
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B. Textualism
Another development that undermined the 1970s and 1980s cases was
the rise of textualism.249 “Modern textualism . . . maintains that, contrary to
the tenets of strong intentionalism, respect for the legislative process requires
judges to adhere to the precise terms of statutory texts.”250 This theory gave
courts reasons to be skeptical about the legislative intent arguments at the
foundations of Holloway, Smith, DeSantis, Sommers, and Ulane.251 After
these decisions, the Supreme Court increasingly began “emphasizing that
legislation routinely has unintended consequences and that judges must give
effect to the actual commands embedded in clearly worded statutes rather
than to the apparent background intent of the legislators who voted for
them.”252 Most notably, Justice Scalia’s 1998 opinion in Oncale made clear
that sex discrimination could include male-on-male sexual harassment,
despite the fact that this application of the sex amendment would not have
occurred to the statute’s drafters.253 The rise of textualism called into question
the old cases, which had strained to invent limiting interpretations of the
statute to avoid its application to contexts that judges thought the 1964
Congress would not have approved of.
In 2008, a district court judge observed that the old cases had followed
the outdated approach to statutory interpretation from Church of the Holy
Trinity: “that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.”254 The early cases turned on an interpretation of the statute as only
prohibiting a discharge based on sex if the employer’s motive was to
disparately harm men or women as groups. This limitation—not any textual
argument or dictionary definition—was what drove the results of those

249. See Eyer, supra note 15, at 83–85 (identifying “the rise of textualist modalities of statutory
interpretation” as a reason for “the increasing success of LGBT sex discrimination claims”); cf.
Feldblum, supra note 176, at 659 (predicting that “a strict textualist approach” had promise in
convincing judges that Title VII’s sex discrimination provision “achieve[d] protection for people
who change their sex, protection for people who love someone of the same sex, and protection for
people who do not meet societal expectations of sex”).
250. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
251. Id. (“In particular, textualists argue that the (often unseen) complexities of the legislative
process make it meaningless to speak of ‘legislative intent’ as distinct from the meaning conveyed
by a clearly expressed statutory command.”).
252. Id.; see Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212–13 (1998) (“[T[he fact that a
statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
253. See text accompanying supra note 14 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (Scalia, J.)).
254. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).

2019]

How Circuit Precedent Got Title VII Wrong

119

cases.255 Smith—the first appellate decision to hold “homosexuality” was out
of bounds—was explicit about not following the text of Title VII.256 Smith
relied on Willingham, a case that unabashedly invented its interpretation of
the sex amendment out of what it construed as the vacuum of legislative
history.257 Holloway—the first appellate decision to hold “transsexuality”
was out of bounds—based its interpretation on the legislative history of the
1972 amendments.258 Ulane at least purported to reason from the text.259 But
Ulane asked the wrong question: whether “sex” includes “sexual identity
disorder[s].”260 The question the statute asks is whether Ulane was
“discharge[d] . . . because of” her “sex.”261
The early cases relied on the inference that Congress had not intended
to cover “transsexualism” or “homosexuality” based on failed legislative
proposals to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.262
While mid-twentieth century Supreme Court decisions had “sometimes
found meaning in congressional refusal to adopt legislation,”263 the advent of
textualism rendered suspicious any such reliance. In 1990, the Supreme Court
called failed proposals a “particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an
interpretation of a prior statute.”264 As Professor Eskridge has explained, the
“usual explanation” for failed proposals is “inertia.”265 “For the current Court,
rejected proposals have only been considered relevant when Congress enacts

255. See Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 519–20 (D. Conn. 2016)
(explaining that while Holloway and Sommers purport to reason from the “‘plain’ or ‘traditional’
meaning of the word ‘sex,’ . . . rather than examining what the word ‘sex’ means, they intuit what
Congress must have intended the statute to do with respect to sex (while acknowledging that there
is virtually no legislative history to guide them)”).
256. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978) (asking “whether a line
can legitimately be drawn beyond which employer conduct is no longer within the reach of the
statute”) (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)).
257. See supra notes 126–132 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
259. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
260. Id.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Title VII forbids an employer from discriminating
against a transgender woman because of her female sex, because of her presumed male sex, or
because of some other presumption about her nonconformity with her sex. See supra notes 231,
237–240, and accompanying text.
262. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977)), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
263. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 389.
264. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 2678, 110
L.Ed.2d 579 (1990).
265. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 389.
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a law, considers alternatives, and explicitly rejects those alternatives.”266 That
was not the case with Title VII.267
With the focus on the text, concerns about “bootstrapping” in derogation
of the legislature’s purpose evaporated.268 Plaintiffs were able to pursue
arguments that would have otherwise been foreclosed, like the sexstereotyping theory.269 Sex-blind interpretations, like the district judge’s
“layman’s reaction” in Ulane that the “simple word” “sex” obviously covered
discrimination against someone for being “transsexual,”270 gained
plausibility.271 Rather than fixating on the question of what the transgender
plaintiff’s “true” sex was, courts began to recognize that it did not matter—
the statutory text forbids sex discrimination in any event.272
Lesbian and gay plaintiffs also began to persuade courts with
comparator arguments—that if, for example, a lesbian were a man rather than
a woman, no one would object to her marriage to a woman. 273 Early courts
had rejected comparator arguments, reasoning that an employer who refuses
to hire effeminate men has not discriminated if it also refuses to hire
masculine women,274 or an employer who refuses to hire lesbians has not
discriminated if it also refuses to hire gay men.275 But after Oncale, it could
not be a defense to Ann Hopkins’ claim that Price Waterhouse also fired men
who failed to conform to sex stereotypes.276 Neither could it be a defense to
266. Id.
267. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is impossible to
assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative
congressional approval of [a particular] statutory interpretation.” (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989))), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 343–44 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Those failures can
mean almost anything, ranging from the lack of necessity for a proposed change because the law
already accomplishes the desired goal, to the undesirability of the change because a majority of the
legislature is happy with the way the courts are currently interpreting the law, to the irrelevance of
the non-enactment, when it is attributable to nothing more than legislative logrolling or gridlock
that had nothing to do with its merits.”).
268. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
“bootstrapping” argument on the ground that Title VII’s protection against sex stereotyping was not
conditioned on whether or not a person was “transsexual”).
269. Id.
270. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 822, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
271. See sources cited supra notes 5–6 (giving examples of the sex-blind argument in recent
appellate decisions).
272. See sources cited supra note 240.
273. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 345–47 (7th Cir. 2017); Zarda,
883 F.3d at 116–19.
274. See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 154–159 and accompanying text.
276. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
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a lesbian’s claim that an employer also fired gay men for failing to conform
with expectations for their sex.277 With concerns about “bootstrapping”
eliminated, lesbian, gay, and bisexual plaintiffs were able to pursue other
theories as well, such as the “associational theory” based on Loving v.
Virginia that, just as it is discrimination to fire an individual for engaging in
an interracial relationship, it is discrimination to fire an individual for
engaging in a same-sex relationship.278
C. Normalization of LGBTQ Identities
In addition to these changes in Supreme Court doctrine and prevailing
methodologies of statutory interpretation, the case law changed because the
misunderstandings and prejudices about LGBTQ identities and gender
nonconformity that it was based on began to fade away.279 Arguments about
immutability had been proxies for debates over the morality of
homosexuality and transsexuality. When moralistic concerns about LGBTQ
identities lost their force, immutability arguments became irrelevant. This
shift has been more definitive in the sexual orientation context than with
respect to transgender identity.
At the time of Bennie Smith’s case, effeminacy in a man was considered
by an employer to be a sign of “sexual aberration.”280 Same-sex intimacy was
regarded as immoral, if not criminal, and homosexuality was considered an
illness.281 In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized that homosexuality is now
understood to be “both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”282 As a result of this shift in social values, judges stopped trying
to find limiting principles, like the Willingham rule,283 that would prevent the
statute from reaching lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees.284 And after
277. Id.
278. See id. at 124–28; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 347–49 (7th
Cir. 2017) (en banc). The First Circuit accepted a theory that it was sex discrimination to forbid men
from wearing feminine clothing if women are permitted to wear masculine clothing. Rosa v. Park
W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000).
279. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 335–36; Eyer, supra note 15, at 83–84; Franklin, supra note 21,
at 1377–78.
280. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 328 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978).
281. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2596 (2015).
282. Id. (striking down laws that restrict marriage to different-sex couples); see also Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down a law that criminalized same-sex intimacy);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (striking down an amendment to a state constitution
that would have barred any state or local laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation).
283. See supra Part I.B (discussing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir.
1978)).
284. Judge Posner made the point bluntly. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d
339, 354–55 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The position of a woman
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Obergefell legalized same-sex marriage, circuit courts saw a disturbing
dissonance in an interpretation of Title VII that meant “a person can be
married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.”285
In the 1970s and 1980s, transgender women could not argue that the
basis for their discrimination was their perceived biological “male” sex,
because they would have been unable to distinguish themselves from
transvestites and homosexuals, groups that were associated with stigmatized
sexual behaviors.286 As those stigmas faded, these arguments appeared.287
This shift in understanding of sexual orientation has been so complete that
now in dissent, some judges reason that sexual orientation is uncovered
because it is a “different immutable characteristic” than sex.288 In doing so,
they turn the logic of immutability upside down, making it a ground for
denying protection.
In the 1970s and 1980s, transgender women were thought to be suffering
from mental illnesses simply by virtue of the fact that they did not identify as
men. In 2013, the Fifth Edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM-5”) omitted the diagnostic
category “gender identity disorder” to clarify that “having a gender identity
different from one’s assigned sex is no longer a ‘disorder’; it is perfectly
healthy.”289 Simply being transgender290 is not a medical condition, and not

discriminated against on account of being a lesbian is thus analogous to a woman’s being
discriminated against on account of being a woman. That woman didn’t choose to be a woman; the
lesbian didn’t choose to be a lesbian.”).
285. Id. at 372 (Posner, J., concurring) (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698,
714 (7th Cir. 2016)); see also id. at 355 (majority opinion) (“We now understand that homosexual
men and women (and also bisexuals, defined as having both homosexual and heterosexual
orientations) are normal.”).
286. See supra notes 73–75, 179–183 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 231–237 and accompanying text.
288. Hively, 853 F.3d at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting); cf. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring) (arguing that Title VII forbids discrimination
based on gender nonconforming “behavior” but not based on a “status” like LGBTQ identity).
289. Kevin M. Barry et. al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 519 (2016) (discussing DSM-5). This change reflected
transgender rights advocacy, which sought to carve out social and political space for “transgender”
as an identity category, rather than a clinical diagnosis. See Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals
Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 141,
152–53 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
290. The definition of a “transgender” person is anyone whose gender identity does not match
the one associated with the sex they were assigned at birth. See, e.g., GLAAD, supra note 2426,
at 10.
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all transgender people seek medical treatment related to their transgender
identities.291
The DSM-5 now includes a listing for “gender dysphoria,” a condition
that may require treatment when transgender people experience distress.292
At the time of Holloway in 1977 and Ulane in 1983, some health care
professionals considered transgender identity a delusion to be treated by
psychoanalysis. Today, not only have experts concluded that these
“conversion” therapies are not supported by evidence; they also recognize
that such therapies are “potentially harmful.”293 There is now a body of
medical research to support treatment approaches for gender dysphoria.294
This research suggests “an individualized approach to gender transition,
consisting of a medically-appropriate combination of hormone therapy,
living part- or full-time in one’s desired gender role, gender reassignment
surgery, and/or psychotherapy.”295
Holloway and Ulane reflect the views of some of their era’s medical
professionals that transgender identity was not just a mental illness, but a
dangerous, delusional, immature condition. Today, the medical profession
has made clear that transgender identity “implies no impairment in judgment,
stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities.”296 Courts
have recognized this as well.297 The perception of transgender identity as
something “unusual” or “freakish” no longer has the hold it did at the time of

291. See generally SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER
SURVEY 99–103 (2016), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%
20Report%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/83BB-6VCP].
292. Barry, supra note 289, at 519.
293. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES’ SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, ENDING CONVERSION THERAPY: SUPPORTING
AND AFFIRMING LGBTQ YOUTH 51 (2015), http://https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma154928.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW3N-A9S6].
294. Barry, supra note 289 at 521.
295. Id.
296. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, POSITION STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST TRANSGENDER AND GENDER DIVERSE INDIVIDUALS (2018), https://www.aglp.org/
APAPositionStatements/Position-2018-Discrimination-Against-Transgender-and-Gender-DiverseIndividuals.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P25-9LC9]. Discrimination and harassment are the reasons
transgender people face challenges in the workplace. Id.
297. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 209 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he Court is aware
of no argument or evidence suggesting that being transgender in any way limits one’s ability to
contribute to society.”), vacated sub nom. on other grounds, Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19
(D.C. Cir. 2019); Bd. of Educ. of Highland v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D.
Ohio 2016) (“[T]here is obviously no relationship between transgender status and the ability to
contribute to society.”).

124

Texas Law Review Online

[Vol. 98:83

Ulane.298 While widespread biases against transgender people remain, the
view that transgender identities are immoral no longer predominates.299
However, immutability arguments continue to bear a mark on the
doctrine in cases involving transgender plaintiffs. Although the recent trend
among federal circuit courts has been in favor of transgender plaintiffs,300 in
2007 the Tenth Circuit held that discrimination on the basis of transgender
status was not a form of sex discrimination per se.301 In that case, the plaintiff,
Krystal Etsitty, who “describe[d] herself as a ‘pre-operative transgendered
individual’” was a bus driver for the Utah Transit Authority (“UTA”).302
Etsitty wore “makeup, jewelry, and acrylic nails to work,” but she did not
have the money for surgery.303 She was fired because the UTA was concerned
that it would face liability “if a UTA employee with male genitalia was
observed using the female restroom” at one of the stops along her route. 304
Etsitty argued the discrimination against her was on the basis of sex because
it was “directly connected to the sex organs she possesses,” in other words,
because of her “male” sex.305
Instead of evaluating this argument, the court asked whether it could
adopt an “expansive” interpretation of Title VII that “would include
transsexuals as a protected class.”306 It reflected: “Scientific research may
someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ so that it extends
beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and female” by showing
that “sexual identity may be biological.”307 The court’s reference to a “shift
in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’” demonstrates it viewed its task as
something other than applying the term’s original meaning. It saw the
298. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 354 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner,
J., concurring) (“[N]ow of course transgender persons are common.”); TAYLOR ET AL., supra note
88, at 4 (“One important change has been the increasing visibility of transgender people and trans
themes in our media culture. For instance, Time magazine’s June 9, 2014 issue gave transgender
rights center billing for its cover story ‘Transgender Tipping Point.’”).
299. There have been few public opinion polls to address transgender issues specifically, but a
2015 study found that only 29%–32% of respondents agreed with the statement that “sex changes
are morally wrong.” TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 88, at 67–68. 37%–39% did not agree with the
statement, and the remainder were neutral. Id. Over 60% agreed that “transgender people deserve
the same rights and protections as other Americans.” Id. at 73. 29.7% were neutral as to this
statement, and 9.11% disagreed. Id.
300. See supra notes 232 & 237 and accompanying text.
301. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). The court did not
resolve whether Etsitty had a sex stereotyping claim. Id. at 1224.
302. Id. at 1218–19.
303. Id. at 1219.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1221.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1222. For the point that “sexual identity may be biological,” the court cited an equal
protection case, Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995). Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222.
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question before it as whether Etsitty’s “sexual identity” was analogous to the
categories of male and female, not whether she lost her job on account of her
employer’s categorization of her as male. Because the court understood the
issue to be which classes the statute protects, the immutability of “sexual
identity” became relevant.308 By contrast, in recent appellate cases involving
restroom usage in schools, courts have affirmed the rights of transgender
students to use restrooms consistent with their gender identities.309 In these
cases, judicial concerns about immutability may have been defused by the
recognition that transgender girls have “lasting, persistent” gender identities
as girls, and transgender boys have “lasting, persistent” gender identities as
boys.310
D. Decline of Workplace Sex Distinctions
A final development has been the declining perception that workplace
sex distinctions, such as those with respect to restrooms and dress codes,
naturally require enforcement based on biological sex. Judges have resisted
sex-blind interpretations of Title VII and comparator arguments out of
concern that they would lead down a slippery slope toward the invalidation
of all rules that separate the sexes.311 Some judges regard these “comfortable
308. Id. at 1223.
309. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 528–29 (3d Cir. 2018); Whitaker v.
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2017); Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016) (deferring to the Obama-era Department
of Education’s interpretation of regulations under Title IX, which forbids certain forms of sex
discrimination in schools), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
310. Doe, 897 F.3d at 522; see also Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050 (explaining that the plaintiff, a
transgender boy, “has a medically diagnosed and documented condition”; that “[s]ince his
diagnosis, he has consistently lived in accordance with his gender identity”; and that “the decision
to do so was not without cost or pain”). By contrast, Etsitty did not frame her claim around her
identity as a woman. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221, 1223 n.3 (noting the plaintiff did “not claim
protection under Title VII as a woman who fails to conform to social stereotypes about how a
woman should act and appear”). For discussion of the benefits of framing claims in ways that “fully
embrac[e] the reality of transgender identity, which includes the reality that transgender people
thrive when they are permitted to live authentically as the men and women that they are,” see
Alexander Chen, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Understand Transgender People, SLATE (Oct. 18,
2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/supreme-court-transgender-discrimination-sex
.html [https://perma.cc/V3S7-Z2T8].
311. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 134 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Jacobs, J., concurring) (“But when the comparator test is used for textual interpretation, it carries
in train ramifications that are sweeping and unpredictable: think fitness tests for different
characteristics of men and women, not to mention restrooms.”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019); id. at 150–51 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (mentioning dress codes, restrooms, and gendernormed physical fitness standards); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 2019)
(Ho, J., concurring) (“Separate bathrooms for men and women are of course ubiquitous in our
society . . . because they protect the privacy of both sexes. . . . But they are unlawful under the
blindness approach to Title VII, because separate bathrooms are obviously not blind to sex.”).
Gender-normed physical fitness standards—such as the requirement that a man do more push-ups
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gender conventions” as so self-evidently nondiscriminatory that any
interpretation of the term “because of . . . sex” that might reach them must be
out of bounds.312 Yet it is unlikely that the existence of men’s and women’s
uniform or restroom options is under legal threat.313 Problems arise when a
worker is fired or harassed for choosing the “wrong” option.314 As the strict
enforcement of sex-segregated workplace policies has come to seem less
inevitable, natural, or necessary,315 real and hypothetical dress code and
restroom dilemmas have begun losing their grip on the statute.
It is no longer implausible to require sex-specific dress codes to meet a
BFOQ defense.316 As late as 2006, the Ninth Circuit held that it was
permissible for Harrah’s Casino to fire a female bartender because she
refused to comply with a dress code that required women, but not men, to
wear makeup, among other rules.317 The court reasoned that this dress code
imposed equal burdens on men, who had to keep their hair short (above the

than a woman to become an FBI agent, see, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 150 (Lynch, J., dissenting),
(discussing Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 342, 351 (4th Cir. 2016))—are facially discriminatory
practices that can be analyzed based on whether they meet the BFOQ defense or are necessary to
avoid a disparate impact on women. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (“[T]he
employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact
liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”); Clarke, supra note 4,
at 979 n.531.
312. See Clarke, supra note 4, at 816 (quoting YURACKO, supra note 30, at 45).
313. The EEOC has not concluded that its decisions recognizing anti-LGBTQ discrimination
as sex discrimination invalidate all workplace policies offering men’s and women’s restrooms or
dress options. Nor have any courts gone that route. To the contrary, see Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1055
(observing that “allowing transgender students to use facilities that align with their gender identity
has actually reinforced the concept of separate facilities for boys and girls”). Courts are likely to bar
what they regard as facial challenges to such policies on the ground that an individual did not suffer
any discrimination in the “terms or conditions” of employment. Cf. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119
(Katzmann, J.) (“Whether sex-specific bathroom and grooming policies impose disadvantageous
terms or conditions is a separate question . . . .”). I do not mean to say I think this is a good thing. I
agree with those who argue the ideal resolution to restroom problems is “making all facilities ‘all
gender,’ with larger, open, public spaces and fully enclosed private stalls that would better ensure
safety, accommodate families, and operate fairly and efficiently,” see Clarke, supra note 4, at 894,
and that dress codes based in notions of professionalism that rely on a binary understanding of
gender should be revised, cf. id. at 965, 978–79.
314. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560, 573 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (distinguishing the case from dress
code challenges because the plaintiff, a transgender woman, “fully intended to comply with the
company’s sex-specific dress code” in wearing the women’s option, and was fired “simply because
she refused to conform to the Funeral Home’s notion of her sex”).
315. See Clarke, supra note 4, at 951–63, 974–90 (cataloguing the diminishing number of
contexts in which sex distinctions remain relevant to employment law and arguing binary legal sex
categories are not generally necessary to serve the purposes of these legal regimes).
316. Perhaps it never was. See supra notes 122–123 (noting the EEOC and a number of district
courts took this approach in the early years of the statute).
317. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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shirt collar) and were not allowed to wear makeup.318 To say the decision has
been much-criticized is an understatement.319 There was no business
imperative behind the policy.320 Harrah’s failed to argue its dress code
qualified for the BFOQ defense, because the policy obviously did not;
indeed, the dress code was so unnecessary, if not counterproductive, that
Harrah’s eliminated it after the plaintiff filed suit.321
In recent cases, dress code hypotheticals come up as reasons for
cramped interpretations of Title VII’s bar on discrimination “because
of . . . sex.” In the Second Circuit’s Zarda decision, a dissenting judge asked,
“what of a pool facility that requires different styles of bathing suit for male
and female lifeguards?”322 That the question of whether it was sex
discrimination to fire Donald Zarda for being gay might be resolved by a
hypothetical bathing-suit dilemma is troubling323 considering all the
variations such scenarios could take, each meriting consideration on its
particular facts.324 The majority set hypothetical questions aside. In Harris
Funeral Homes, where the employer actually had a sex-specific dress code,

318. Id. at 1109 (rejecting “Jespersen’s position that a sex-based difference in appearance
standards alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case [of sex
discrimination]”).
319. See, e.g., Case, supra note 64, at 1336. See generally Symposium, Makeup, Identity
Performance, & Discrimination, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2007) (responding to the
Jespersen decision with a symposium on the topic).
320. The plaintiff, Darlene Jespersen, had succeeded at her job as a bartender without wearing
makeup. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106–08.
321. Id. at 1114 n.2 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
322. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 150 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
323. Cf. Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 73 (2013) (describing
how the Affordable Care Act litigation turned on a hypothetical argument about broccoli regulation,
and arguing that “[t]he Court’s premature engagement with limiting principles bypassed the benefits
of its ordinary incremental, case-by-case analysis and circumvented institutional synergies that can
generate superior and more democratically legitimate outcomes”).
324. For example, an employer who “required both male and female lifeguards to wear a
uniform consisting only of trunks would violate Title VII,” Zarda, 883 F.3d at 150 (Lynch, J.,
dissenting), because that policy could be a pretense for excluding women, a form of sexual
harassment, or a policy with a disparate impact on women. Whether a Las Vegas swimming pool/
strip club hybrid could get away with this is an interesting question for an employment
discrimination exam. As to an employer who “prescribed trunks for men and a bathing suit covering
the breasts for women,” id., in the unlikely event that such a policy were challenged, requiring a
business rationale would result in productive legal discussions of social norms with respect to
gender and modesty. Cf. Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (recognizing
that a criminal law that allows men, but not women, to bare their breasts is a sex-based classification,
but holding it survived review because its purpose of “promoting traditional moral norms and public
order” was “self-evident and important”). But see id. at 382 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the city’s justification “boils down to a desire to perpetuate a stereotype that female breasts are
primarily the objects of desire, and male breasts are not”).
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the Sixth Circuit concluded that if an employer cannot fire a transgender
woman because it disapproves of the fact that she wears women’s clothing in
general, it should not be able to fire her just because it has put in place a
formal policy that bars her from wearing women’s clothing.325
In addition to dress codes, hypothetical restroom concerns continue to
constrain interpretations of Title VII’s text.326 In Etsitty, the court did not
resolve Crystal Etsitty’s argument that she had been fired for failing to
conform to sex stereotypes, because it concluded that her employer, UTA,
had a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for firing her: specifically, its
concern about lawsuits from women complaining about a person with “male
genitalia” using the women’s restroom.327 Since Etsitty would not have
exposed her genitals to other women in any public restroom,328 UTA’s real
reason was more likely that the public would view a transgender woman’s
use of the women’s restroom as “radical” or “inappropriate.”329 Even though
UTA’s fear of lawsuits was speculative—there had been no complaints
against Etsitty and it was unlikely any potential plaintiff would have legal
ground for a suit—the court refused to question UTA’s “business judgment”
on the point.330 Had the court instead reasoned that Etsitty lost her job because
of her sex and UTA therefore had to demonstrate a BFOQ, it is likely UTA
would have lost.331
Courts have not analyzed whether privacy or safety concerns in other
contexts might suffice as BFOQ arguments. The BFOQ defense would put

325. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (“[T]he Funeral Home may not rely
on its [sex-specific dress code] policy to combat the charge that it engaged in improper sex
stereotyping when it fired Stephens for wishing to appear or behave in a manner that contradicts the
Funeral Home’s perception of how she should appear or behave based on her sex.”).
326. See cases cited supra note 311.
327. Etsitty v. Utah Trans. Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (“However far Price
Waterhouse reaches, this court cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological males to
use women’s restrooms.”); see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D.
Ohio 2003) (holding that an employer did not engage in sex-stereotyping where it required a
transgender woman to use the men’s restroom because it “did not require Plaintiff to conform her
appearance to a particular gender stereotype, instead, the company only required Plaintiff to
conform to the accepted principles established for gender-distinct public restrooms”), aff’d, 98 F.
App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
328. Etsitty argued that “no one would know she was not biologically female.” Etsitty, 502 F.3d
at 1226.
329. See id. at 1225 (quoting UTA’s witnesses).
330. Id. at 1226.
331. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (rejecting
the argument that speculative concerns about tort lawsuits are a valid BFOQ); cf. Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting, in an equal protection case, an employer’s
argument that it had a persuasive justification for firing a transgender plaintiff due to “speculative
concern about lawsuits arising if [the plaintiff] used the women’s restroom”).
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such concerns to critical scrutiny in asking whether they perpetuate sex
stereotypes.332 The BFOQ defense has long been an area of Title VII doctrine
where courts have resolved conflicts between the ideal of sex equality and
the interests in favor of gendered social practices, finding solutions that are
attentive to particular contexts.333 In a number of Title IX cases, schools have
accommodated transgender students by allowing them to use spaces
consistent with their gender identities, while ensuring that all students have
safe and private restrooms and changing facilities.334 As institutions work out
accommodations for transgender individuals and those solutions are
contested through legal processes, restroom dilemmas no longer seem as
unsolvable as they did at the time of Sommers in 1982, or even at the time of
Etsitty in 2007.
Conclusion
This Essay has attempted to address Judge Ho’s concern that “if the first
forty years of uniform circuit precedent nationwide somehow got the original
understanding of Title VII wrong, no one has explained how.” 335 The answer
is that early courts conflated “transsexualism,” “homosexuality,” and
“effeminacy” in men as mental illnesses, aberrations, and blameworthy
deviations from sex roles. Rather than applying the text of Title VII, these
courts devised limiting principles that would prevent the law from reaching
these plaintiffs, based on conjectures about congressional intent, group-based
understandings of civil rights, moralistic immutability principles, and
antiquated medical opinions. Changes in Supreme Court doctrine on sex
stereotyping, the rise of textualism, and the gradual fade of myths about
LGBTQ individuals have now allowed circuit courts to get it right. It remains

332. Courts have long held that discriminatory “customer preferences” do not suffice as BFOQ
arguments, because they would undermine the very purpose of Title VII. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to
allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination
was valid.”).
333. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2565–68 (1994) (discussing
opinions on the BFOQ defense for sex-differentiated dress codes); Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17–30 (2000)
(explaining how courts have resolved conflicts between the “norm of sex blindness,” “historically
given gender conventions,” and the “functional rationality” of business imperatives in evaluating
BFOQ arguments).
334. See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 287 (W.D. Pa. 2017)
(noting that “cases involving transgender status implicate a fast-changing and rapidly-evolving set
of issues that must be considered in their own factual contexts”); see also Doe v. Boyertown Area
Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 530 (3d Cir. 2018); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1052–53 (7th Cir. 2017).
335. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring).
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to be seen whether the Supreme Court will follow their lead. While this Essay
was undergoing final revisions, the Supreme Court held oral arguments in the
Gerald Bostock, Donald Zarda, and Aimee Stephens cases.336 Restroom
dilemmas dominated.337
But whatever the outcome of the cases pending in the Supreme Court,
the evolution of circuit court doctrine on this question has lessons for
progressive approaches to civil rights law. It shows that a number of
theoretical approaches often favored by progressives can be turned to
regressive ends. Purposive approaches to statutory interpretation are often
associated with progressive causes due to their relative flexibility. Yet they
may also be employed to narrowly construe civil rights law so as not to
challenge the perceived biases of earlier eras. Group-based understandings of
civil rights are often associated with progressive approaches like disparate
impact law and affirmative action. Yet courts may also employ group-based
understandings to exclude plaintiffs they regard as falling outside traditional
groups or as belonging to new social groups. Immutability considerations
have progressive potential in questioning social structures that allocate
opportunities based on accidents of birth. Yet they may also be employed to
rationalize discrimination against individuals who are regarded as
responsible, on some level, for their own misfortunes. Medical expertise—
often faulted by progressives for pathologizing identities—can play a role in
undoing that same dynamic. This is not to say that any one theory, method,
or source is preferable to another; rather, it suggests reasons for progressive
lawyers to be wary of theoretical rigidity.
An important part of the evolution of the doctrine in favor of protecting
LGBTQ plaintiffs was contestation of conventional sex roles and gender
norms, both in and out of court. Whatever results in the Supreme Court this
term, it is worth revisiting the stories of Ramona Holloway, Bennie Smith,
Audra Sommers, and Karen Ulane, among others, and re-examining the
biases, prejudices, and misunderstandings about LGBTQ people that caused
the first forty years of circuit court precedent to get Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision wrong.

336. See cases cited supra note 1.
337. See, e.g., Masha Gessen, The Supreme Court Considers L.G.B.T. Rights, but Can’t Stop
Talking About Bathrooms, NEW YORKER (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/the-supreme-court-considers-lgbt-rights-but-cant-stop-talking-about-bathrooms [https:
//perma.cc/4DTG-9MSR].

